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REFLECTIONS ON FIFTEEN YEARS OFTHE TEAGUE V LANE
RETROACTIVITY PARADIGM: A STUDY OF THE
PERSISTENCE, THE PERVASIVENESS, AND THE
PERVERSITY OF THE COURT'S DOCTRINE
LYN S. ENTZEROTH*
Co-defendants John and Mary are tried separately for capital murder, convicted,
and sentenced to death in July of 1988.' They separately appeal their convictions
and death sentences in state court, each seeking a new trial based on a faulty jury
instruction on the state's burden of proof. Due to delays in producing and filing the
court record, delays in both the defense and state's appellate offices, and delays in
the court system, John's case proceeds through the state direct appeal process much
more slowly than Mary's case. In June of 1989, the state supreme court affirms
Mary's conviction and sentence, specifically rejecting her bid for a new trial based
on the faulty jury instruction. Mary petitions the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari
review. As it does with the vast majority of certiorari petitions, the Court, in
November of 1989, denies the petition. In November of 1990, while John's case is
still pending on state direct appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari and
issues a short per curiam opinion in Cage v. Louisiana,2 holding that a jury
instruction identical to the one used in both John's and Mary's cases is unconstitutional. Because John's case is pending on state direct review at the time the
Supreme Court decides Cage, John receives a new trial with a jury instructed in
accordance with the Constitution. He is convicted of second-degree murder and
sentenced to forty years in prison.
Mary's fate is less clear. To obtain the benefit of Cage, Mary seeks collateral
relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.3 After meeting all of the
procedural requirements to obtain federal habeas review,4 Mary will benefit from
Cage only if the Supreme Court, pursuant to Teague v. Lane,5 applies Cage retroactively to cases such as Mary's. For Mary, timing is everything.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; J.D., Tulane University, 1987; B.A.,
University of Wisconsin, 1982. I would like to thank Russell Christopher, Randy Coyne, Janet Levit, Valerie
Phillips, and Tamara Piety for their support, patience, and kind counsel during this project. I also would like to thank
Nicholas Haugen for his outstanding research and assistance in this work. All errors, of course, lie solely with me.
1. This problem is purely hypothetical; however, it serves as a fairly realistic example of the issues that
arise in defining the retroactive scope of new rules of criminal law.
2. 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (per curiam) (holding jury instruction unconstitutional where it inaccurately
defined reasonable doubt resulting in a jury verdict "based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due
Process Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment), overruled on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62
(1991) (indicating that proper inquiry is whether a jury is likely to be confused by reasonable doubt instruction).
See John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty Pleasto Aid CriminalJurorCompensation,
39 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 1187, 1240 (2002).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
4. Among the procedural requirements that must be met before a federal court will review the merits of a
federal habeas petition are filing the habeas petition within the applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1) (2000); exhausting all state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2000); and presenting federal claims that
are subject to habeas review, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000).
5. 489 U.S. 288 (1989); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313-14 (1989) (applying Teague to
capital sentencing proceedings), overruled in part on other groundsby Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

Who benefits from a new rule or a change in constitutional criminal procedure
has proved to be an issue of immeasurable importance and concern in the administration of criminal justice.6 Over fifteen years ago,7 the Supreme Court rewrote the
rules controlling which defendants receive the benefit of changes in the Court's
decisional law, a determination that is now based primarily on where in the criminal
process a case is pending.8 In the 2003-2004 Term, the Supreme Court applied these
rules in Schriro v. Summerlin9 and Beard v. Banks,'0 confronting which death row
inmates would benefit from the constitutional guarantees articulated by the Court
in Ring v. Arizona" and Mills v. Maryland.12 On June 24, 2004, a divided Court held
that criminal defendants whose cases were pending in federal habeas review would
not benefit from either Ring or Mills.' 3 As a result, a number of death row inmates,

who were sentenced to die in a manner that plainly violates the Constitution, will not
be entitled to re-sentencing proceedings and may be put to death based solely on the
fortuitous timing of their convictions and sentences.
This Article looks at the retroactive application of criminal procedure decisional
law, particularly in light of the Court's most recent decisions on this question. Who
benefits from which constitutional protections implicates significant jurisprudential,
political, and practical considerations. Understanding why the issue of retroactivity
has played such a controversial and important role in the criminal justice system
requires a study of the evolution of the doctrine over the last forty years. This task
demands, at the outset, an overview of the theoretical and practical underpinnings
of the doctrine of retroactivity and the criminal post-trial process, including state
direct appeals and federal habeas corpus review, in which retroactivity concerns
arise. The article then turns to the modem history of the retroactivity doctrine,
considering in depth the dominant model of retroactivity from the early 1960s to
1989, the shift away from this model, and the post-1989 retroactivity model that
operates today. This backdrop sets the stage for an examination and critique of the
Court's current doctrine as reflected by Schriro v. Summerlin'4 and Beard v. Banks 5
and the implications and impact of the Court's approach to retroactivity and criminal

6. The issue of who benefits from the pronouncement of a new rule of law also arises in civil cases. This
article focuses on retroactive application of changes in criminal law. There are a number of excellent articles
addressing retroactivity in civil law including Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and ProspectiveApplication
of Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 811, 819-20 (2003); Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is
a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CoNN. L. REv. 1075, 1097-1100 (1999); Pamela
J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, Reliance and Stare Decisis, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515,
1521-24 (1998); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity andLegal Change:An EquilibriumApproach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055,
1059-63 (1997); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1731, 1754-55 (1991).
7. See Teague, 489 U.S. 288; Penry, 492 U.S. 302.
8. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
9. 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
10. 124 S. Ct. 2504 (2004).
11. 536 U.S. 584,589 (2002) (overruling, in part, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), and holding that
the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find aggravating factors necessary for imposition of the death penalty).
12. 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (holding unconstitutional capital sentencing proceeding where there existed
reasonable probability that jurors believed they had to unanimously agree on mitigating factors in order to consider
such factors in deciding whether to sentence defendant to life or death).
13. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2526; Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 2515.
14. 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
15. 124 S. Ct. 2504 (2004).
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justice, including its7 effect on Blakely v. Washington 6 and the pending case of
Roper v. Simmons.1

I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF CHANGES
IN THE LAW: UNDERLYING ISSUES AND COMPETING DOCTRINES
As mentioned at the outset, the doctrine of retroactivity addresses the question of
who benefits from a change--either significant or minor-in the law. Until the
middle of the twentieth century, the prevailing wisdom was that legislation applied
prospectively, 8 to future conduct, and judicial decisions applied retroactively, to
past actions as well as future actions." This view of judicial retroactivity was in
accord with the writings of William Blackstone who posited that judges discover the
law; they do not create it.2' As such, when a court overturned a prior decision and
declared an arguably "new rule" of law,2' the overturned decision was viewed as
having never been law, but rather a misinterpretation of the law.2 2 Accordingly, the
more recent decision expressed what the law always had been.23 As Supreme Court
Justice Miller 24 explained, "I understand the doctrine to be, in such cases, not that
the law is changed, but that it was always the same as expounded by the later
decision, and that the former decision was not, and never had been, the law, and is
overruled for that very reason."25 Consistent with this view of the role of the
judiciary in the development of the law, a court's most recent decision, including a
decision that overturned precedent, applied to all cases regardless of their temporal
relation to the change in the court's understanding of the law.26

16. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). In Blakely, id. at 2538, which was decided the same day as Summerlin, 124 S.
Ct. 2519, and Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state sentencing system that
provided that the judge find certain facts that could be used to support an increase in a criminal sentence above the
maximum prescribed sentence. The Court did not address the retroactivity question in Blakely.
17. 124 S. Ct. 1171 (2004) (granting certiorari to address question of whether imposition of death penalty
on person under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime violates the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
18. See Roosevelt, supranote 6, at 1075 ("Legislation is presumptively treated as non-retroactive, but it may,
subject to certain limitations imposed by the Ex Post Facto Clause, operate retroactively if the legislature so
desires."). See generallyJohn Bernard Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61
N.C. L. REV. 745, 746 (1983) (discussing eighteenth and nineteenth century concepts of the creation of law).
19. See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Judicial decisions
have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years."); see also Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 373, 374 (1977); Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1075-76; Corr, supranote 18, at 746.
20. See Harper v. Va.Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 107 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-24 (1965), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).
21. The precise definition of new rule is a slippery slope, and the current Court is divided on its meaning.
See, e.g., Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 229-252, the definition of a new rule
of law is controversial as well as pivotal to retroactivity theory.
22. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623; see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1758-63.
23. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623; see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1758-63.
24. Justice Samuel Freeman Miller was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Abraham Lincoln. He
served as an associate justice from 1862-1890. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 547-48 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
25. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 211 (1863) (Miller, J., dissenting); see Munzer,
supra note 19, at 375.
26. Fallon & Meltzer, supranote 6, at 1734 (stating that the Blackstone view was "that the function of the
courts is to apply the law, not make it, and that judges, once they have found the law, have no warrant to refuse to
apply it regardless of when the relevant conduct occurred").
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There are significant advantages to this Blackstone model. For example, the
Blackstone model provided a straightforward and simple rule: judicial decisions
apply retroactively. Also, the concept that judges do not create law seems in accord
with the principles of stare decisis 27 and the evolution of common law, that is, that
judges are bound by precedent in crafting their decisions. As Justice Thurgood
Marshall noted, adherence to precedent and the slow building of judicial doctrine
permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather
than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of
our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact. While
staredecisis is not an inexorable command, the careful observer will discern that
any detours from the straight path of stare decisis in our past have occurred for
articulable reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged "to bring ' 2its
opinions into agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained. 1

Nonetheless, the Blackstone model of legal interpretation and change has shortcomings. In particular, the Blackstone model seems to show little regard for the
parties' expectations, which can create serious practical problems when the court
unexpectedly changes society's understanding of the law.29 On a more fundamental
level, Blackstone's idea that judges discover rather than create the law may not
satisfactorily reflect the complete function of the courts. Indeed, a number of modem
scholars and jurists reject the idea that judges simply discover the law and have no
role in the creation of law. 30 As Justice Clark observed in Linkletter v. Walker:31

27. Stare decisis, of course, is the well-recognized common law principle assuring that courts give proper
deference to precedent. See generally Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in HistoricalPerspective: From the Founding
Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REv. 647, 652-54 (1999). Of course, the doctrine of stare decisis raises
some complex interests and ideas about the role of the Supreme Court in the development of the law. See, e.g., Jill
E. Fisch, The Implications of TransitionTheory for StareDecisis, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 93, 94-97 (2003);
Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 1011, 1012-16 (2003); Lee, supra, at
648-52.
28. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruledby Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 378
(1938)); see Lee, supra note 27, at 653.
29. See Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1089-90; Fisch, supranote 6, at 1058; Munzer, supra note 19, at 376.
30. Munzer, supra note 19, at 375. Not all modem scholars have abandoned Blackstone. For example,
Ronald Dworkin advocates a neo-Blackstone analytical approach to law making and retroactivity. Roosevelt, supra
note 6, at 1104-06; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1759 ("Dworkin depicts law as a seamless web, and he maintains that all legal questions have one right answer.") (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 266-71 (1986)).
Having noted the more complicated role of judges in the development of the law, it, however, would be
unwise to dismiss the Blackstone model out of hand. For example, in the vast majority of cases pending in state and
federal courts, judges do not create law, but rather apply existing law to a particular case. Paul Mishkin, Forward:
The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 58-60 (1965). To
that extent, Blackstone's description of the work of judges appears largely valid. Id. Likewise, even though the
Supreme Court is unique in the nation's court system and even though the Court's justices tend to decide the most
difficult, the most cutting-edge, the most divisive, and the most politically charged cases, the decisions issued by
the Supreme Court "are still necessarily conditioned by traditions, processes, and institutions of law." Id. at 63
(citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960)). To some degree, the
Blackstone model represents an idealized view of courts and judges as impersonally and impartially applying a fixed
set of legal rules to an individual problem. Id. at 62-63. This view provides a sense that the judicial process is not
dependent on the personal whim and political agenda of the individual judges or justices hearing a case. While
perhaps naive, simplistic, or simply unrealistic, this worldview does reflect a fundamental symbolic and aspirational
goal of the court system. Id. at 62-63.
31. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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[Jiudges do in fact do something more than discover law; they make it interstitially by filling in with judicial interpretation the vague, indefinite, or generic
statutory or common-law terms that alone are but the empty crevices of the law.
Implicit in such an approach is the admission when a case is overruled that the
earlier decision was wrongly decided. However, rather than being erased by the
later overruling decision it is considered as an existing juridical fact until overruled, and intermediate cases finally decided under it are not to be disturbed.32
This more nuanced and complex view of the role of judges contributed to the
transition from the Blackstone retroactivity model to the retroactivity models that
emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century.33
As stated earlier, under the Blackstone model, all judicial decisions apply
retroactively, at least in part, because a new decision simply reflects the way the law
always has been.34 However, if courts occasionally create law, then the newly
created law is not simply a reflection of the law as it always has been. Rather, the
new law represents the law as the court now understands it. 35 Under this description
of a new law, questions emerge as to whether that new law should control actions
that occurred prior to its creation when the old law was still in effect. In other words,
should the court limit its decision in some temporal manner so that the new rule is
applied to some, but not all, prior cases? Relatedly, if a decision is restricted
retroactively, so that only some cases have the new rule applied to them, where
should the court draw the line?
One modem model of retroactivity analysis advanced by Professors Fallon and
Meltzer uses the law of remedies as an analytical framework for determining who
should benefit from a change in the law.36 Under this model, after applying a high
threshold test to decide whether a legal opinion actually produces a new rule of
law,37 the test for determining whether to apply such a new rule retroactively turns,
at least in part, on the predictability of the new rule.38
Within a remedial framework, the question whether to deny retroactive effect to
a relatively unpredictable decision is properly governed "not by metaphysical
32. Id. at 623-24.
33. It has been asserted that positivist legal theory, as most notably expounded by H.L.A. Hart, "open[edl
the way to a distinction between 'old' and new law." Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1760. However, it has been
observed that even for Hart the
distinction between judge-made new law and judge-found old law tends to blur in practice. Even
in penumbral cases, Hart writes, the judicial task is an exercise not of independent political will
but of legal judgment. Judges thus stick close to the lawbooks in rendering decisions, as they
weigh and balance "principles, policies, and standards" in a manner that is tightly structured by
the nature of the judicial office.
Id. at 1761 (quoting H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 107 (1983)) (footnotes omitted).
34. See supranotes 18-25 and accompanying text.

35. See supranotes 25-28 and accompanying text.
36. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1833.
37. As noted infra text accompanying notes 229-252, whether a decision is in fact new or simply an
elaboration of current law is a fairly interesting and at times controversial question. See, e.g., Banks, 124 S.Ct.
2504. Professors Fallon and Meltzer argue that in the context of habeas review a new rule should be defined "to
exclude rules and decisions that are clearly foreshadowed, or reflect ordinary legal evolution, not just those that are
'dictated by precedent."' Fallon & Meltzer, supranote 6, at 1817 (footnote omitted) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at
301).
38. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1793-94.
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conceptions of the nature of judge-made law, nor by the fetich of some
implacable tenet, such as that of the division of governmental powers, but by
considerations of convenience, of utility, and of the deepest sentiments of

justice."39

Another model offers an equilibrium approach to retroactivity analysis. 4° Under
this model of retroactivity, the question of whether to apply a new rule retroactively
focuses on the legal context within which the new rule emerges: "Rather than
evaluating new legal rules in isolation-in terms of their novelty or foreseeabilityequilibrium theory focuses the inquiry on the regulatory structure and seeks to
characterize that structure in terms of its stability."4 This analysis turns on the
extent to which a change in the law disturbs the equilibrium of the law and the
parties' reliance on the law.42 A third approach to the retroactivity of constitutional
decisions is the decision-time model, which focuses on the just result at the time of
the trial.43

All of these theories address the practical and theoretical dilemmas of who should
benefit or be burdened by changes in the law and how to assure predictability and
stability in allocating these burdens. Related to these concerns is the constitutional
role of the Supreme Court in developing and changing the law. For the past forty
years, the Court has struggled with these concerns, producing a lineage of cases that
have generated varying reactions as to their efficiency and fairness in deciding who
benefits from a change in decisional law.
II. THE RETROACTIVITY QUESTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
CRIMINAL APPEALS AND COLLATERAL REVIEW PROCESS
In the context of criminal procedure, retroactivity has become a particularly
troublesome issue. The problem, at least in part, emerges out of the significant
changes in constitutional criminal procedural law that occurred primarily, although
not exclusively, in the second half of the twentieth century, as well as the
incorporation of these changes to the states.44 As is well-chronicled, 45 one of the
most notable legacies of the Warren Court is its expansion of the rights of criminal
defendants, including guaranteeing the right to counsel to indigent state criminal

39. Id. at 1833 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 148-49 (1921))
(footnote omitted).
40. Fisch, supra note 6, at 1058.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1117. A recent article suggests that, based on the decision-time model
proposed by Professor Roosevelt, the Court should apply Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),
retroactively to cases pending in federal habeas corpus review. See Comment, Collateral Damage: How the
Supreme Court's Retroactivity Doctrine Affects FederalDrug Prisoners' Apprendi Claims on CollateralReview,
81 N.C. L. REV. 1220, 1254 (2003). In light of Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004), this argument no
longer seems likely. See infra notes 400-489.
44. See generallyERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION §§ 15.2-15.3 (4th ed. 2003).
45. A number of articles have discussed the legacy of the Warren Court from differing points of view,
including Corrina Barrett Lain, CountermajoritarianHero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the
Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2004); Ronald F. Wright, How the Supreme Court
Delivers Fire and Ice to State Criminal Justice, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (2002); Robert M. Cover & T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, DialecticFederalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1976-1977).
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47
defendants,46 requiring police to administer Mirandawarnings to criminal suspects,
and excluding from state trials certain evidence procured by the government in
violation of the Constitution. 48 However, having expanded such rights, the Warren
Court faced the questions of which and, importantly, how many criminal defendants
should receive the benefit of those changes.4 Intimately tied up with these questions
was the effect that full retroactivity would have on the state and federal governments
that had to implement these new procedural rules and the effect that full retroactivity
would have on the Court's ability, both politically and jurisprudentially, to make
sweeping changes in criminal procedure.5 °
In addressing the retroactivity question in the context of criminal procedure, a
myriad of interests emerge. For example, a criminal defendant has an interest in a
trial that comports with the Constitution. A trial that does not comport with the Constitution may be defective not only in its process, but also in the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence as well as the sentencing decision, particularly if the
death penalty is imposed. Further, a criminal defendant has an interest in having a
trial that is conducted in the same manner, or at least under the same constitutional
protections, as the trials of other criminal defendants. Society also has an interest in
assuring that the prosecution of a criminal defendant complies with the requirements
of the Constitution so as to protect the innocent from wrongful convictions and
punishment, particularly the death penalty, and to promote and protect the rule of
law.
Conversely, a state that conducts a criminal trial that comported with the
constitutional procedural rules existing at the time of the trial has a reliance interest
in that process and an interest in leaving that process undisturbed.5' State govemments can face significant burdens when a new rule of law is applied to alreadyconvicted defendants who are then entitled to new trials and/or sentencing proceedings. These burdens include the financial costs of new prosecutions and trials;
the expenditure of time and resources by the police, the state prosecutor, and the
state court; the difficulty involved in retrying cases years after the occurrence of the
crime; and the potential emotional impact on the victims of crime who may now
have to participate in or otherwise experience a second judicial proceeding.5 2 The

46. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that Sixth Amendment applies to states and
indigent state criminal defendants have right to appointed counsel). The Court applied Gideon retroactively to all
criminal defendants regardless of when their conviction and sentence were imposed. Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S.

847 (1971) (per curiam).
47. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing now-classic Miranda warnings). The Court
declined to apply Miranda retroactively and limited it to trials that began after the decision was announced. Johnson
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966).
48. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to states). The Court declined to apply
this rule retroactively to cases that were final at the time the Court decided Mapp. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).
49. For examples of the Warren Court's retroactive application of significant changes in constitutional law,
see supra notes 46-48. For a general discussion of these issues, see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1739-40.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 128-130.
51. See Mishkin, supra note 30; Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
52. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 15.5, at 904-05; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at
1764-67 (discussing cost of retroactivity within a law of remedies framework); Fisch, supra note 6, at 1084-94
(noting prudential considerations that argue both for and against retroactivity of laws).
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consequences of granting or denying the retroactive application of a new rule of
criminal procedure are widespread and substantial.
The retroactive application of new rules of criminal procedure will have a different effect, both practically and theoretically, at various stages of the trial and posttrial process. For example, applying new rules only to individuals who have yet to
stand trial would result in a much smaller group benefiting from changes in criminal
procedure and would impose a much smaller cost on the states than applying rules
retroactively to criminal defendants in the process of seeking a writ of habeas
corpus. In addition, habeas review, which involves federal courts reviewing final
judgments of state courts, implicates concerns of federalism and finality that are not
at issue, or at least not at issue to the same degree, in cases pending on direct
appeal.5 3 These differences have caused scholars and jurists to articulate differing
concerns over the retroactive application of new rules of law depending on whether
a case is pending in the direct appeal process or in habeas corpus review. 4 Since
under the Court's current retroactivity doctrine the procedural posture of the case is
considered critical in determining whether an individual receives the benefit of a
new rule of law, 55 a brief explanation of the applicable post-trial criminal process is
warranted.
A. Trial and Direct Appeal
Each state has its own unique criminal process, and there are important distinctions among the states. Nonetheless, most states provide a somewhat similar trial
and direct appeal process, and a discussion of this general process will illuminate the
issues that emerge in applying changes in the law retroactively when a case is
pending on direct appeal.56
The first stage of a criminal proceeding begins with the criminal trial in a state
trial court.57 At trial, evidence is presented and rebutted, and a jury renders a verdict
and sentence. Obviously, this trial must be conducted in accordance with certain
constitutional substantive and procedural rules and guarantees. For example, a
criminal defendant is entitled to constitutionally effective counsel.5 8 Likewise, the
number of jurors 59 and the manner by which those jurors are selected for

53. For an early discussion of these federalism concerns, see Mishkin, supranote 30; Bator, supra note 51.
But see Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability andDue Process: A Reply to ProfessorMishkin, 33 U. CHI. L.
REV. 719 (1965-1966).
54. Retroactive application of new rules of law can also arise in state collateral or post-conviction
proceedings. For an interesting article discussing the issue of retroactive application of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002), in Missouri post-conviction proceedings, see Hon. Laura Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Court
Authority to Grant HabeasRelief, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 421 (2004).

55. See infra Part IV.
56. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 15.5, at 896-98; RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (2d ed. 2001).
57. This trial stage includes all pre-trial proceedings and post-trial proceedings that may occur before a direct
appeal is taken.
58. See Stricdand v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
59. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (finding that conviction by five-member jury violates
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (finding that conviction by sixmember jury does not violate Sixth Amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (applying Sixth
Amendment jury trial guarantee to states).
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service 6° must be in accordance with certain constitutional guarantees. During the
trial, the trial judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel are entrusted with the responsibility of assuring that the trial comports with the Constitution. Thus, there exists an
expectation on the part of the interested parties, including the defendant, the victim,
and society in general, that the trial will comport with the Constitution.
However, trials are not flawless, and a defendant's ability to appeal a conviction
and sentence is well entrenched in American law. 6' In general, after conviction and
sentencing, a defendant may appeal the conviction and sentence through the applicable state court appellate system. For example, a defendant may ask a higher court
to review the trial court's decision based on a belief that a jury instruction was
unconstitutional or that certain evidence was admitted in violation of the Constitution. After reviewing the defendant's claims, the appellate court may affirm the
defendant's conviction and sentence or may grant some form of relief including, but
not limited to, a new trial, a new sentencing proceeding, or a modification of the
conviction and sentence.
If the highest applicable state court 62 affirms the defendant's conviction and
sentence, or otherwise denies relief, the defendant may file a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court seeking direct review of federal claims.63 The
petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed within ninety days of the highest state
court's decision, 6' and the Supreme Court has discretion to grant the writ and hear
the case, or deny the writ, ending the direct appeal process. 65 This discretionary
review is the only opportunity for a state defendant to have a federal court hear
federal claims in the direct review process. After exhausting or concluding this
direct appeal process, including the process for seeking a writ of certiorari with the

60. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (finding it unconstitutional for state prosecutor to use
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner).
61. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
62. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000), the Supreme Court is authorized to review "[flinal judgments or decrees
rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had."
The decisions of lower state courts are reviewable by the Supreme Court when there is no
appellate review of such rulings within the state and when they thus constitute the judgment of
the highest courts in which review can be had.... Similarly, when a state's highest court declines
to review a lower state court decision, that lower court decision can be reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 10.4, at 667.
63. Prior to 1916, a state criminal defendant, in certain circumstances, could file an appeal on a writ of error
with the U.S. Supreme Court. See REV. STAT. § 709 (1875); Curtis Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of
Abortive State Proceeding,74 HARv. L. REV. 1315, 1328 (1961). However, prior to 1916, many of the constitutional
criminal rights now taken for granted had not yet been developed and/or incorporated to the states. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 15.2, at 870. Since 1916, Congress has conferred much greater discretion on the
Supreme Court, which has discretion to hear direct appeals from state courts. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000);
45 STAT. § 54 (1928); 43 STAT. §§ 236, 237 (1925); 39 STAT. § 726 (1916); Reitz, supra,at 1328. Since the Court
hears only a small fraction of the cases presented to it in certiorari petitions, few state direct appeals are heard by
the Supreme Court each year. See Nine Justices, Ten Years: A Statistical Retrospective, 118 HARV. L. REV. 510,
514 tbl.1 (2004); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 10.1, at 639.
64. SuP. CT.R. 13.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000).
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Supreme Court,' and after being denied relief by all applicable courts, a criminal
defendant's conviction and sentence are deemed "final." 67
B. CollateralReview
The conclusion of the direct appeal process does not end the defendant's opportunity to seek relief from conviction and sentence. Both state and federal law provide for some form of collateral review of a defendant's conviction and sentence.
A number of policy reasons undergird collateral review processes, not least of which
is the policy of assuring fairness and reliability in the criminal process.68 There are
generally two collateral review processes that are available to a criminal defendant:
state post-conviction review and federal habeas corpus review. A separate discussion
of each collateral review process follows.
1. State Post-Conviction
After a state direct appeal, a defendant may be able to seek further state review
through a state's post-conviction process. The post-conviction apparatus varies from
state to state, and each state determines the applicable process, the issues that may
be raised in state post-conviction review, and the timing of the state post-conviction
proceedings. 69 The state post-conviction process allows a criminal defendant to seek
collateral review of a conviction and sentence usually, although not universally,
after the conclusion of the direct appeal process.7" Often the criminal defendant is
limited in the issues that may be raised in state post-conviction. 7' For example, states
often curtail a defendant's ability to raise issues that were not raised on direct
appeal, but which were known to the defendant. 72 Likewise, many state postconviction systems limit the defendant's ability to re-litigate issues already raised
on direct appeal.73 In many cases, defendants will not have claims amenable to state
post-conviction review and, accordingly, will forgo that process. If the state court

66. A defendant is under no obligation to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. If a defendant
does not file a certiorari petition, the defendant's direct appeal is deemed over and the conviction and sentence are
considered final after the expiration of the ninety days to file the certiorari petition. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479
U.S. 314 (1987); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
67. The Supreme Court, in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989), defined a conviction and sentence as final when the defendant had exhausted direct appeal, including the
defendant's opportunity to seek certiorari review with the Court. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322; Teague, 489 U.S. at 295.
While one may wish to quibble with this definition, for purposes of this article and its retroactivity analysis, the term
"final" is used in the sense defined by the Supreme Court in Griffith and Teague.
68. See, e.g., LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERALCOURTS: HABEAS CORPUS (2003); Reitz, supranote 63, at 1325.
Even scholars envisioning a more limited role for collateral review recognize its importance. See, e.g., Mishkin,
supra note 30; Bator, supra note 51.
69. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-39-1 to 99-39-29; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1080, 1089; 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9541-9546 (West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-30-101 to 40-30-313.
70. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1080, 1089; 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9543 (West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102.
71. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1080, 1089; 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9543 (West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102.
72. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-21; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1080, 1089; 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9544 (West 1998).
73. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-21; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1080, 1089; 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9544 (West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-30-101 to 40-30-313.
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denies state post-conviction relief, the defendant may file a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which the Court then may grant or deny.
2. Federal Habeas Corpus
After exhausting all state avenues for relief, including state direct appeal and, if
appropriate, state post-conviction or collateral review,74 a criminal defendant has a
third process of review that can be pursued: a defendant can petition a federal
75
district court for a writ of habeas corpus asking for release from prison. In reviewing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a federal court considers only claims
showing that the petitioner is being held in state custody in violation of federal law,
that is, federal statutes, federal treaties, and the Federal Constitution.76 Therefore,
if a defendant believes that a constitutionally defective jury instruction was used at
trial, and relief was not granted on direct appeal, the defendant may petition a
federal court to review the claim and grant a writ of habeas corpus to obtain release
from prison.
The writ of habeas corpus has a long history, tracing its roots to at least
78
77
fourteenth-century English law. Habeas corpus means "that you have the body,
and the writ originally was used, at least on some occasions, to bring a person before
the court for judicial proceedings. 79 By the seventeenth century, and as specifically
established by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the writ of habeas corpus evolved
under English law into a procedural tool that allowed individuals to challenge their
confinement by the crown. 0 The writ thus served as a procedural device to control
the abuse of the judicial process by the crown.8" So critical was this procedural
protection that Blackstone described the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 as a "stable
bulwark of our liberties. 82
The British colonists brought these ideas and the protection of the writ of habeas
corpus with them to the American colonies, and the writ operated, at least to some
degree, in the colonies prior to the ratification of the U.S. Constitution.8 3 Mindful
of the importance of the writ of habeas corpus, the drafters of the Constitution
specifically preserved the writ of habeas corpus in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of
the U.S. Constitution: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may

74. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (2000).
2.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000); U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 9, cl.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000).
77. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supranote 44, §§ 15.1-15.3, at 862-80; YACKLE, supra note 68, at 9-11;
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 56, at 661-69; WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS
CORPUS 12 (1980).
78. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004).

79. YACKLE, supra note 68, at 9-11.
dissenting).
80. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2660-62 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
81. YACKLE, supra note 68, at 9-19 (discussing English history of the writ).
82. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 133, quoted in Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at
2662-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, §§ 15.2-15.3, at 868-80; COYNE & ENTzEROTH, supra note 56, at
661-69; DUKER, supra note 77; Lyn Entzeroth, FederalHabeasReview of Death Sentences, Where Are We Now?:
A Review of Wiggins v. Smith and Miller-el v. Cockrell, 39 TULSA L. REv. 49 (2003); see also ERIC FREEDMAN,
HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY (2001).
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require it. 'g4 In the FederalistPapers,Alexander Hamilton praised the inclusion of
the writ 85in the Constitution as a great stalwart of liberty and protection against
tyranny.
The power of a federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus was embraced early
in U.S. history. In enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress specifically authorized federal courts to issue the writ to federal prisoners.86 After the Civil War and
in light of congressional distrust of southern states' willingness to enforce federal
law and protect former slaves,87 Congress specifically amended the habeas statute
providing that federal courts could issue the writ to any person held in state or
federal custody "in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States., 8 8 The Supreme Court initially opined that "[tihis legislation is of the most
comprehensive character. It brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every
court and of every judge every possible case of deprivation of liberty contrary to the
National Constitution, treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction."89
Despite the Court's early expansive language regarding federal court post-Civil
War power to issue the writ, the Court, in other important respects, curtailed the writ
of habeas corpus during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.'
Perhaps the most notable restriction was that a habeas writ could issue only where
the state court lacked jurisdiction to convict or sentence a defendant. 9' Although the
language of the habeas statute did not express such a restriction, the Court appeared
to recognize one.
The first inroads into this limited construction of the writ of habeas corpus
appeared in the 1920s,92 but it was during the 1950s and 1960s that the writ came
to be a more commonly used legal process by which criminal defendants obtained
relief from unlawful detentions.9" Several factors arguably contributed to this

84. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2662-63 (noting that the writ of habeas corpus is the only common law writ
mentioned in the Constitution).
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 479-80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also TIlE
FEDERALIST No. 83, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The role of the Great Writ in
protecting individuals from arbitrary detention by the President was addressed recently in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124
S. Ct. 2633, 2660-62 (2004).
86. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 81-82; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 15.2, at 868; Entzeroth,
supra note 83; Bator, supra note 51. See generally Reitz, supra note 63, at 1325. Recently, some scholars have
offered thought-provoking alterative views of early habeas corpus doctrine and have argued that the power of early
federal courts to issue the writ was more expansive. FREEDMAN, supra note 83; Gerald Neuman, Habeas Corpus,
Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 961 (1998).
87. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 15.2, at 869; YACKLE, supra note 68, at 30-34; Reitz, supra note 63,
at 1325.
88. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 STAT. 385 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255); see CHEMERINSKY,
supranote 44, § 15.2, at 868-69; Reitz, supra note 63, at 1325.
89. ExparteMcCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 15.2,
at 868-69; Reitz, supra note 63, at 1325.
90. For example, the Court required state prisoners to exhaust their state remedies before seeking relief in
federal court. ExparteRoyall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); Reitz, supra note 63, at 1325.
91. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); see CHEMERINSKY, supranote 44, § 15.2, at 868-70; YACKLE,
supra note 68, at 34-38; Reitz, supra note 63, at 1325.
92. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); see Reitz, supra note 63, at 1328; see also YACKLE, supra note
68, at 38-39.
93. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by Keeney
v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), overruled by Keeney, 504 U.S. 1;
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
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development in habeas litigation. First, during the twentieth century, the Court,
through the incorporation doctrine, extended a number of federal constitutional
rights to the states. 94 This extension of federal rights to state criminal defendants
dramatically increased the number of cognizable claims that a state prisoner could
raise in a habeas petition. 9 Second, after World War H, national attention turned to
civil rights and criminal justice, and there was increasing concern, particularly
among the justices on the Supreme Court, about the circumscribed legal and
political condition of African-Americans in the South. 96 Finally, during most of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court possessed complete, or nearly complete,
discretion to hear a claim arising out of a state direct appeal. 97 Since the Supreme
Court hears only a very small percentage of certiorari petitions from state criminal
appeals in any given year,98 the chance of direct federal review of a state conviction
and sentence is extraordinarily limited. Federal habeas review, then, provided
another means for federal court review of federal claims arising out of state criminal
proceedings. 99 Among the cases seen as important in expanding the scope of the writ
to state criminal defendants were Fay v. Noia,'°° which allowed a state defendant to
raise claims in federal habeas that were not raised in state court provided the defendant had not deliberately bypassed the state process,1 ' and Brown v. Allen, 0 2 which
allowed a defendant to raise all constitutional claims in a habeas petition. 0 3 The writ
of habeas corpus soon became not only a means by which federal courts could
collaterally review federal claims arising in state criminal proceedings, but also an
avenue for the Court to craft new procedural criminal law rules.0 4
The more active role of federal courts, including the Supreme Court, in issuing
writs of habeas corpus met with strong criticism. 105 Grumbling from the bench and
the legislature about the broad scope of habeas during the Warren Court years
resulted in a number of judicial decisions by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
curtailing the scope of the writ.' 6 In 1996, Congress crafted its most significant
changes to the habeas statute since the Civil War by enacting the Antiterrorism and

94. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 44, § 15.2, at 870-71.

95. Id.
96. Id.; cf. YACKLE, supranote 68, at 47.
97. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000).
98. While thousands of petitions for a writ of certiorari are filed with the Supreme Court every year, less than
100 or so cases receive full review by the Court. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 10.1, at 639.
99. See id. § 15.2, at 870-71.
100. 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruledby Keeney, 504 U.S. 1.
101. Id. at 399.
102. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
103. Id. at 444.
104. In his dissent in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), Justice Brennan listed a number of Supreme Court
decisions in which the Court crafted a new rule or changes in the law during its review of a habeas corpus petition.
See id. at 334-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 15.5.1, at 897-99, 898 n.10.
105. See, e.g., Frank W. Wilson, HabeasCorpus and the State CriminalDefendant, 19 VAND. L. REV. 741
(1966); Bator, supra note 51.
106. See, e.g., Keeney, 504 U.S. 1(denying federal evidentiary hearing of factual claim not developed in state
court unless petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice for failure to develop claim in state court) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (holding federal court cannot hear claim that
was procedurally defaulted in state court unless defendant shows cause and prejudice for default); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976) (finding Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims not cognizable in federal habeas).
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Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)." 7 While still providing that a
federal court may "entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that
he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States,' 08 the AEDPA limits the time period for filing a habeas petition,' ° curtails
a petitioner's ability to file a second and successive habeas petition, "' and redefines
the discretion federal courts must give to state court findings of fact and law."'
Under current habeas law, any federal judge or Supreme Court justice can issue
a writ of habeas corpus." 2 As a practical matter, a criminal defendant usually will
file a writ of habeas corpus with a U.S. district court seeking issuance of a writ from
that court. If a court grants the writ, the court will typically order the prison warden
to release the prisoner unless retrial or resentencing occurs within a certain period
of time, or unless the state advises the federal court within a certain time period that
it intends to appeal the court's decision." 3 If denied relief at the district court level,
the habeas petitioner must obtain a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial
of the petition to the applicable circuit court of appeals." 4 If denied relief at the
circuit court level, the habeas petitioner may petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, which the Court may grant or deny.
III. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF NEW RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FROM 1965 TO 1989
A. Linkletter v. Walker and Stovall v. Denno-The Emergence of a Model
Restricting the Retroactive Application of New Rules of Law
As the Warren Court expanded the scope of constitutional criminal rights and as
the writ of habeas corpus increasingly became a means for state prisoners to challenge their convictions and sentences, the question of how wide the net of constitutional protection extended came to the fore. In Linkletter v. Walker,15 the Court
articulated the first of its modem restrictions on the retroactive application of
judicial decisions. 116

107. One scholar has described the AEDPA as the most significant change in habeas corpus law since 1867.
Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorismand Effective Death Penalty Act: What's Wrong with It and How to Fix It,
33 CONN. L. REv. 919,923 (2001).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)-(e).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
113. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 577 (D. Md. 2001) (ordering, in issuing writ of
habeas corpus to Wiggins, that he "shall be RELEASED within THIRTY (30) DAYS unless within that time
respondents advise this court that they intend to appeal this decision, in which event counsel shall contact the court
to discuss the issue of the appropriate forum to consider the question of petitioner's release pending appeal"), rev'd
by Wiggins v. Corcoran, 228 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd by Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
115. 381 U.S. 618 (1965), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).
116. Id. at 622 (referring to Blackstone's view of retroactivity and noting, "[a]t
common law there was no
authority for the proposition that judicial decisions made law only for the future").
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As noted earlier, during the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court announced a
number of landmark decisions regarding the constitutional rights guaranteed to state
criminal defendants." 7 By 1965, a majority of the Court appeared willing to
announce a rule limiting the retroactive scope of some of the Court's more groundbreaking decisions,"' and the Court took the opportunity presented in Linkletter to
announce this new doctrine. However, before announcing the retroactivity doctrine,
which was itself groundbreaking, the Court had several important hurdles to overcome. Specifically, the Court had to determine (1) whether there existed a doctrine
that, as a matter of law or judicial policy, required all Court decisions to apply
retroactively," 9 and (2) whether the Constitution compelled all Court decisions to
apply retroactively.' 20 The existence of either a judicial or constitutional doctrine
requiring retroactive application of all new rules would have cut off all efforts to
limit the scope of changes in the law.
The first issue-whether case law or judicial doctrine required full retroactivity-posed a direct confrontation with the Blackstone view of the courts and
the creation of law. In addressing this issue, the Court rejected, at least in part,
Blackstone's view that judges simply discover the law.' 2 ' In so doing, the Court
observed:
The Blackstonian view ruled English jurisprudence and cast its shadow over our
own as evidenced by Norton v. Shelby County. However, some legal philosophers continued to insist that such a rule was out of tune with actuality largely
repeal ofttime did "work hardship to those who [had] trusted to
because judicial
122
its existence."
The Court further pointed to several cases in which the Court itself had allowed
limited retroactive application of a few court decisions,' 23 although the Court
acknowledged that it also had endorsed competing retroactivity views, including the
Blackstone view. 24 After considering these competing judicial philosophies and
differing judicial actions, the Court ultimately concluded that neither legal philosophy nor the Court's own practices actually prohibited limits on the retroactive
application of certain Court decisions.'25
As to the second question, the Court did not find any prohibition in Article HI or
any other provision of the Constitution requiring the Court to give full retroactive
effect to its decisions. 126 However, in considering the scope of new rules, an interesting question is raised about whether, consistent with Article 1I of the Constitution,
the Court may issue a purely prospective decision binding only on future cases,
excluding even the parties in the case before the Court from the benefit of the new
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1739-40.
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622-28.
Id. at 628-29.
Id. at 623-24.

122. Id. at 624 (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 625-29.
124. Id. at 628 n. 13 (noting criminal cases in which new rules of law are applied retroactively to cases
pending in federal habeas).
125. Id. at 629.
126. Id. at 628.
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law. Arguably, allowing such purely prospective decision making runs afoul of the
case and controversy requirement of Article L127 as well as raising concerns about
the Court acting as a legislature. These questions present important and substantial
issues about the power of the Court. However, in Linkletter, the Court dodged such
questions because Linkletter dealt only with denying a criminal defendant the
benefit of a new rule on federal habeas review; 28 the Court was not trying to issue
a purely prospective decision.t29
Having found no express constitutional, common law, or other judicial prohibition, the Linkletter Court resolved that it retained the discretion to determine
whether to give full or partial retroactive effect to a decision creating a new rule of
law. 3 ° The Court then set out to establish a method by which to make such determinations. This analysis became the dominant model of retroactivity from 1965 to
1989.' Although it generally may be referred to as a three-part test,3 2 there were
really four parts in the Linkletter analysis, as discussed below.
In determining the retroactive scope of a decision of the Court, the first question
was whether the Court had in fact issued a new rule of constitutional law.'33 If the
case did not establish a new rule, then there was no reason to restrict the retroactive
scope of the holding in the decision." As the Court noted in United States v.
Johnson:'35
[W]hen a decision of this Court merely has applied settled precedents to new and
different factual situations, no real question has arisen as to whether the later
decision should apply retrospectively. In such cases, it has been a foregone
conclusion that the rule of the later case applies in earlier cases,136because the later
decision has not in fact altered that rule in any material way.
If, however, a decision overturns or unexpectedly changes the law of criminal
procedure, the Court, in its discretion, could limit the retroactive scope of that
decision based on the weighing of three interests or values: (1) the purpose of the
new rule, (2) the reliance placed on the old rule, and (3) the effect that retrospective
application of the new rule will have on the administration of justice. 13 7 In Linkletter,

127. See infra notes 132-151 and accompanying text.
128. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 621.
129. Id. at 627-28.
130. Id. at 629. It should be noted that under this court-created retroactivity doctrine, limits on the retroactive
scope of new rules could take several forms. For example, as the Court did in Linkletter, the Court could deny the
effect of a new rule to cases pending in habeas but allow the new rule to apply to cases that were on direct appeal,
and therefore not final, at the time the Court hands down the new decision. Alternatively, the Court could apply the
new rule only to the parties before it and to all future cases but decline to give effect to the new rule in cases on
direct appeal and habeas. At the most extreme, the Court could issue a decision and deny giving effect to any prior

case, including the parties before the Court, and only give effect to cases in the future.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See generally Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1743-46.
Seeid. at ll41.
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
Id.
457 U.S. 537 (1982).

136. Id. at 549.
137. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629, 636. In Linkletter, the Court used this analysis to decide whether to apply

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), to cases pending in federal habeas review. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636-38. In
Mapp, the Court overturned longstanding precedent by extending the exclusionary rule to the states. 367 U.S. at
660. Apparently, because it overturned long-standing precedent, the Court considered Mapp to be a new rule. See
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the Court weighed these factors and declined to give habeas petitioners the benefit
of Mapp v. Ohio,138 a new rule of law that overturned prior case law on the application of the exclusionary rule to the states.
Linkletter dealt only with the retroactive application of new rules to habeas
proceedings; it did not address the retroactive application of new rules to direct
appeals. Two years later, the Court took its retroactivity tools to direct appeals in
Stovall v. Denno.139 At issue in Stovall was whether United States v. Wade' 4° and
Gilbert v. California,141 in which the Court required exclusion of tainted identification evidence, should be applied retroactively to cases pending in habeas
review. 42 In refusing to give retroactive effect to Wade and Gilbert, the Court concluded that the two decisions announced new rules because the "rulings were not
foreshadowed in our cases; no court announced such a requirement until Wade was
decided by the.. .Fifth Circuit."'' 4 3 After finding that Wade and Gilbertcreated a new
rule, the Court reiterated that "[t]he criteria guiding resolution of the [retroactivity]
question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent
of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect
on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."' 44
declined to extend the benefit of Wade and Gilbert
Applying these criteria, the Court145
to persons seeking habeas relief.
Stovall, however, went further than simply applying the Linkletter analysis to the
habeas petitioner before the Court. The Stovall Court instead took the opportunity
to consider the retroactive effect of Wade and Gilbert to persons on direct appeal:
We also conclude that, for these purposes, no distinction is justified between
convictions now final, as in the instant case, and convictions at various stages

of trial and direct review. We regard the factors of reliance and burden on the
administration of justice as entitled to such overriding significance as to make
that distinction unsupportable. We recognize that Wade and Gilbert are,
therefore, the only victims of pretrial confrontations in the absence of their
counsel to have the benefit of the rules established in their cases. That they must

Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629-35. After making this finding, the Court weighed the three interests the Court deemed
relevant to retroactivity. As to the first factor, the Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule was designed to sanction
police for Fourth Amendment violations and to deter future police misconduct, id. at 636; the Court found applying
Mapp retroactively would not advance this purpose. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636-37. As to the second interest, the
Court determined that states had relied on the pre-Mapp law and followed its rules. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637.
Finally, the Court found that applying Mapp retroactively would impose significant costs on the administration of
justice and would not enhance the fact-finding process. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637-38. Not surprisingly, using this
analysis, the Court declined to apply Mapp to cases pending in federal habeas, although it did apply Mapp to cases
pending on direct appeal at the time of its decision. See id. at 627; see also Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719,
732 (1966) ("Decisions prior to Linkletter and Tehan had already established without discussion that Mapp and

Griffin applied to cases still on direct appeal at the time they were announced.").
138. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
139. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
140. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
141. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
142. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 294.
143. Id. at 299. The term "foreshadow" appeared to allow a broader application of the concept of a new rule
than a requirement that the new rule must overturn a previous decision in order to be new, although arguably a new
rule still would be one that substantially altered existing law.
144. Id. at 297.
145. Id. at 300.
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be given that benefit is, however, an unavoidable consequence of the necessity
that constitutional adjudications not stand as mere dictum. Sound policies of
decision-making, rooted in the command of Article III of the Constitution that
we resolve issues solely in concrete cases or controversies, and in the possible
effect upon the incentive of counsel to advance contentions requiring a change
in the law, militate against denying Wade and Gilbert the benefit of today's
decisions. Inequity arguably results from according the benefit of a new rule to
the parties in the case in which it is announced but not to other litigants similarly
situated in the trial or appellate process who have raised the same issue. But we
regard the fact that the parties involved are chance beneficiaries as an
insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles of decision-making.146
Thus, not only could the Court preclude a habeas petitioner from the benefit of a
new rule, but the Court also could deny defendants on direct appeal the benefit of
the change in law. 47 This basic model for retroactive 48application of new rules
operated throughout the Warren and Burger Court eras.
B. Reaction to the Linkletter/Stovall Retroactivity Doctrine
In many ways, Linkletter and Stovall were the product of divergent political and
judicial policies at issue in the 1950s and 1960s. On the one hand, those justices who
disagreed with the expansion of criminal rights and the incorporation of certain
constitutional rights to the states viewed the Linkletter/Stovall doctrine as a way of
restricting the effect of those judicial changes. 149 Conversely, by finding that at least
partially prospective decisions did not violate the Constitution or the fundamental
principles of the role of the courts, the Court gave itself greater freedom to change
long-standing doctrine. 50 Under the Linkletter/Stovall doctrine, the Court could craft
new rules of criminal procedure without feeling constrained by the cost of applying
the rules retroactively. For those justices who believed such new rules were long
overdue, the Linkletter/Stovall doctrine aided in that process both politically and
pragmatically.' 5'
Perhaps the most significant early critique of Linkletter appeared in an article by
Professor Paul Mishkin.' 52 While agreeing with the ultimate retroactive limits that
Linkletter placed on habeas review, Mishkin disagreed with the analytical approach
employed by the Court. 5 3 He believed that the focus of retroactivity should be on

146. Id. at 300-01 (footnotes omitted).
147. For an interesting discussion of the Linkletter/Stovall doctrine and the cases to which it was applied, see
Corr, supra note 18, at 746; Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years ofNon-Retroactivity: A CritiqueandaProposal,61 VA.
L. REv. 1557 (1975).
148. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1743 & n.47. In a number of cases, the Court refused to give
retroactive effect to new rules to cases pending on direct appeal. See, e.g., DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635
n.2 (1968); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31 (1975).
149. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1739.
150. Id.
151. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
152. Mishkin, supra note 30. But see Schwartz, supra note 53. Later critiques of the Linkletter doctrine
include James B. Haddad, The Finality Distinction in Supreme Court Retroactivity Analysis: An Inadequate
Surrogatefor Modification of the Scope of FederalHabeas Corpus, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1062 (1984-1985); Corr,
supra note 18; Beytagh, supra note 147.
153. Mishkin, supra note 30, at 101-02. This article was published before the Court decided Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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the purposes and role of habeas corpus rather than on the purpose of the new rule
and its effect on the expectations of the state. 154 Troubled in general by prospective
judicial law-making, Mishkin endorsed giving full effect to new rules in all cases not
yet final, that is all cases pending on direct review. 5 According to Mishkin, giving
retroactive effect to cases pending on direct appeal was in accord with wellestablished operational rules of the judicial process. 5 6 Mishkin, however, advocated
a different model when a defendant was seeking application of new rules on habeas
review. According to Mishkin, the decision to apply new rules retroactively to
persons seeking habeas relief should turn on the goals of57the writ of habeas corpus
rather than on an analysis of the three Linkletter factors.
As described by Mishkin, "the prime function of habeas corpus is to secure
individual freedom from unjustified confinement.'.'. 8 However,Mishkin propounded
that "a proper sentence of a competent court imposed after an unquestionably fair
trial is an acceptable justification for continued imprisonment; the mere possibility,
however real, that a new trial might produce a different result is not a sufficient basis
for habeas corpus.' 59 Therefore, new rules of criminal procedure generally should
not apply retroactively to cases pending in habeas review.' 6° However, Mishkin
clarified the limits of his proposal:
Valuing the liberty of the innocent as highly as we do, earlier proceedings whose
reliability does not measure up to current constitutional standards for
determining guilt may well be considered inadequate justification for continued
detention. For to continue to imprison a person without having first established
to the presently required degree of confidence that he is not in fact innocent is
indeed to hold him, in the words of the habeas corpus statute, "in custody in
violation of the Constitution." On this basis, habeas corpus would assess the
validity of a conviction, no matter how long past, by any current constitutional
standards which have an intended effect of enhancing the reliability of the guiltdetermining process. 61
Accordingly, the question of whether to deny the effect of a new rule of criminal
procedure to defendants seeking habeas relief should turn on whether the change in
the law is one that affects the reliability of the truth-finding process of the trial. 62
According to Mishkin, where the Court recognizes a constitutional guarantee that
has the "intended effect of enhancing the reliability of the guilt determining
process,"' 163 it is proper to apply such a decision retroactively to habeas cases."
Mishkin cited with approval the retroactive application of the Court's decisions

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Mishkin, supra note 30, at 101-42.
Id. at 77.
Id. at77-78.
Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 79 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 80.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 81-82 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 79-85.
Id. at 82.
Id.
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extending the right to court-appointed counsel to the states 65 and the right to a trial
transcript for indigent defendants appealing their state convictions. 66 Both of these
due process rules-the right to counsel and the right to a transcript on appeal-went
to the ability to ascertain the truth or accuracy of the criminal process, and, thus,
according to67 Mishkin, habeas petitioners should have the benefit of these changes
in the law.

C. Justice Harlan'sDissenting and Concurring Opinions in Desist v. United
States and Mackey v. United States
A few years after Linkletter and the publication of Mishkin's article, Justice
Harlan, although in the majority in Linkletter, grew dissatisfied with its formula and
sought to craft a different method for analyzing the retroactive scope of new
decisions of criminal procedure. 168 Like Mishkin, Justice Harlan rejected the Court's
focus on the purpose of the new rule and its effect on the reliance interests of the
state;' 69 instead, Justice Harlan focused on the distinctions between direct appeal and
habeas review in determining the appropriate scope of retroactive application of new
rules. 170

In developing his reformation of the Court's retroactivity analysis, Justice Harlan
criticized purely prospective applications of changes in the law and specifically
rejected Stovall v. Denno."7 Instead, echoing both Mishkin's article and language
in Linkletter, Justice Harlan concluded that "all 'new' rules of constitutional law
to direct
must, at a minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject
172
review by this Court at the time the 'new' decision is handed down."'
Justice Harlan's conclusion was buttressed by several reasons regarding direct
appeals and retroactivity. At a fundamental level, Justice Harlan believed the Court
confounded its constitutional adjudicatory role when it treated persons on direct
appeal differently: "We depart from this basic judicial tradition when we simply
pick and choose from among similarly situated defendants those who alone will
receive the benefit of a 'new' rule of constitutional law."' 73 For example, under the
Stovall doctrine, the Court could accept certiorari in a case arising out of a state
supreme court, grant relief in the case, and then limit application of that relief to that
particular case and all future cases. 174 Under this policy, another defendant convicted
on the same day, in the same court, in the same constitutionally defective manner

165. Id.
166. Id. at 82-86.
167. Id. at 82.
168. Desist, 394 U.S. at 256-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675-702 (Harlan, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part).
169. Desist,394 U.S. at 256-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675-702 (Harlan, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part).
170. Desist, 394 U.S. at 256-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675-702 (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
171. 388 U.S. 293 (1967), cited in Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
172. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 258-59.
174. Id. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that Stovall "permits this Court to apply a 'new' constitutional
rule entirely prospectively, while making an exception only for the particular litigant whose case was chosen as the
vehicle for establishing that rule").
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would not receive the benefit of the change in law only because the Supreme Court
had not accepted certiorari in his or her case. 75 According to Justice Harlan, neither
ideas of the function of courts tolerated this type of
the Constitution nor traditional
76
judicial decision making. 1
Justice Harlan posited that, by issuing decisions that do not apply to pending
cases on direct appeal and that, therefore, are almost completely prospective, the
Court was forced to move out of its traditional judicial role and into a legislative
role. 77 As Justice Harlan expounded in his opinion in Mackey:
[1]t tends to cut this Court loose from the force of precedent, allowing us to
restructure artificially those expectations legitimately created by extant law and
which ought properly
thereby mitigate the practical force of staredecisis,a force
7
to bear on the judicial resolution of any legal problem. 1
Rejecting this role for the Court, Justice Harlan espoused a bright line rule with
respect to direct appeals: all79 new rules of law would be applied retroactively to cases
pending on direct appeal. 1
In contrast, Justice Harlan did not believe that cases pending review in a federal
habeas proceeding were entitled to the same treatment.180 In part, this view stemmed
from Justice Harlan's disagreement with the modem habeas process, particularly the
idea that all constitutional claims could be raised in a habeas petition.,' 8 As Justice
Harlan advised in his dissent in Fay v. Noia,8 2 the use of the writ to challenge state
detentions, at least as the writ was used in the latter part of the twentieth century,
was an "unsound extension" of the writ and was not sufficiently deferential to the
interests of federalism. 8 3 Justice Harlan feared that allowing new rules to apply in
habeas proceedings would result in constant relitigation of every state conviction
and sentence every time a new rule was issued, which would undermine the finality
and stability of criminal convictions. 8' The role of habeas review, according to
Justice Harlan, was limited to (1) protecting against imprisonment by a system that
created an undue risk of imprisoning someone who is actually innocent'85 and (2)
acting as an incentive to state courts to conduct their proceedings in accordance with

175. See id.
176. Id. at 258-60 (Harlan, I., dissenting); Mackey, 401 U.S. at 681 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
177. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addition, Justice Harlan
cautioned that refusing to apply new constitutional rules on direct appeal might deter those who did not have the
necessary financial resources from litigating and presenting important federal questions to the Supreme Court. Id.
at 680 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178. Id. at 680-81 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 681 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
180. Id. at 682-89 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Desist, 394 U.S. at 260-65 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
181. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 682-89 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Desist, 394 U.S. at
260-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
182. 372 U.S. 391, 448-76 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.
1(1992).
183. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 684-85 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184. Desist, 394 U.S. at 261-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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the Constitution. 6 Justice Harlan believed habeas review could adequately meet
these goals, particularly the second goal, by simply assuring that the defendant's
trial adhered to the constitutional rules in effect at the time of trial and not at the
time the habeas petition was filed. 7
Based on his view of the purpose of habeas corpus, Justice Harlan advocated
another bright line test: new rules of law would not be applied to habeas
proceedings. 8 However, Justice Harlan did not view this limit as insurmountable;
rather, he recognized two circumstances or exceptions under which new rules should
be applied to habeas proceedings.
With respect to his first exception, Justice Harlan stated that his proposed
retroactivity limits should apply only to new procedural due process rules. 9 He
defined these procedural due process rules as rules that "forbid the Government to
utilize certain techniques or processes in enforcing concededly valid societal
proscriptions on individual behavior."' 9 In contrast, new substantive due process
rules, that is, rules that place certain conduct beyond the power of the government
to regulate or punish, should apply retroactively. 9' Examples of such substantive
due process rules would be decisions prohibiting state regulation of certain conduct,
such as marrying someone of a different racial or ethnic heritage. 192 With respect to
substantive due process rules, the purported interest in finality must yield because
"[t]here is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at a point
where it ought properly never to repose."' 93 Thus, under Justice Harlan's first
exception, new rules of law that place conduct outside the power of government to
proscribe would be fully retroactive and would apply to final convictions being
reviewed in federal habeas proceedings.
As to his second exception, Justice Harlan offered two different constructs.
Initially, in his separate opinion in Desist, Justice Harlan appeared to follow
Mishkin's model and focused on giving full retroactive benefit to new rules that
affect or improve the truth-finding function of the judicial process. 94 However, in
Mackey, Justice Harlan moved away from this approach and proposed that new rules
that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," as that view is understood in
Palko v. Connecticut,'" should be applied retroactively. 96 With respect to Palko, it
would appear that Justice Harlan was referring to a rule that goes to the "very

186. Id. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
187. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 687-88 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. Id.; Desist, 394 U.S. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
189. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 692-93 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192. Id. at 692 n.7 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It would seem that under this theory
persons who were prosecuted under now-unconstitutional sodomy laws should be able to seek habeas relief. See

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
193. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
195. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), and cited in Mackey,
401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion on Palko and the doctrine
of selective incorporation, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(4th ed. 2004).
196. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,"' 197 or that is a principle "rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people."' 98 In other words, Justice Harlan's second
exception would give full retroactive effect to new rules that set out bedrock
procedural rules.99
Of course, as in Linkletter, the threshold question for Justice Harlan was whether
the holding in a particular case was actually a new rule of law. 2' If the decision did
not announce a new rule, then limiting the retroactive effect of that decision was not
at issue. Justice Harlan conceded that determining whether a decision creates a new
rule could prove quite difficult.2 '1 However, as Justice Harlan noted, "One need not
be a rigid partisan of Blackstone to recognize that many, though not all, of this
Court's constitutional decisions are grounded upon fundamental principles whose
content does not change dramatically from year to year, but whose meanings are
altered slowly and subtly as generation succeeds generation." 20 2
D. Beginning of the End of the Linkletter/Stovall Paradigm:Griffith v. Kentucky
In the 1980s, the beginning of the end of the Linkletter/Stovallretroactivity paradigm emerged. In United States v. Johnson, °3 the Court considered the retroactive
effect of the Fourth Amendment rule of Payton v. New York, 2' in which the Court
prohibited the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a
suspect's home to make a routine felony arrest.0 5 In considering whether to apply
Payton retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal, Justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority, criticized the Stovall rule and embraced the points made by Justice
Harlan in his separate opinions in Desistand Mackey.2° Indeed, like Justice Harlan,
the Johnson Court advocated applying all changes in the law retroactively to cases
pending on direct appeal unless the new rule constituted a "clear break" from prior
precedent. 20 7 However, in the particular case before the Court in Johnson, the Court
concluded that Payton did not overrule past precedent and none of the Linkletter
factors supported a restriction on retroactivity. 20 8 Accordingly, the Court applied
Payton to defendants whose cases were pending on direct appeal. 20 9
Five years later, following up where Johnson left off, the Court, in Griffith v.
Kentucky,21 ° attacked Stovall head on and overturned the retroactivity rule that had
allowed the Court to deny the benefit of new rules to cases on direct appeal. 211 As
in Johnson, Justice Blackmun authored the majority opinion. He stated:

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Desist, 394 U.S. at 263 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 263-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 263 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
457 U.S. 537 (1982).
445 U.S. 573 (1980).
Id. at 603.
Johnson, 457 U.S. at 542-48, 562.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 552-54.
Id. at 561-63.
479 U.S. 314 (1987).
Id.at 314.
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In Justice Harlan's view, and now in ours, failure to apply a newly declared
constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic
norms of constitutional adjudication .... [A]fter we have decided a new rule in the
requires that we apply that rule to
case selected, the integrity of judicial review
2 12
all similar cases pending on direct review.
Recognizing that it was impossible for the Supreme Court to review all state cases
on direct review,21 3 the Court concluded, "we fulfill our judicial responsibility by
instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively to cases not yet
final. 214 In addition, failure to give new rules full retroactive effect in cases pending
on direct appeal would create an inequality among criminal defendants that the
Court was no longer willing to tolerate.215 The Court held that "a new rule for the
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or
for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear
federal .... with no exception
21 6
break' with the past.,
Of course, the Griffith Court left open the question of retroactivity in habeas
corpus and whether the Court should continue its Linkletter analysis or adopt some
new test, such as Justice Harlan's model. That issue was addressed in 1989 in
Teague v. Lane217 and Penry v. Lynaugh.2 18 As will be seen, these two cases marked
not only a significant change in retroactivity doctrine, but also in the protections and
scope of federal habeas corpus.
IV. THE ABANDONMENT OF LINKLETTER AND THE RISE
OF TEAGUE AND PENRY
Teague v. Lane, the pivotal case establishing the modem retroactivity doctrine,
concerned the federal habeas petition of Frank Teague, a black man who was
convicted by an all-white jury of various felonies and sentenced to thirty years on
each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.219 During jury selection, the
prosecutor used all of his peremptory challenges to strike black jurors from the jury,
thus assuring that the jury consisted only of white jurors." Teague appealed to the
applicable state appellate court but was denied relief."2 His conviction and sentence
became final in 1983.222 He then sought federal habeas relief from the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois but was again denied relief.223 He
224
appealed, but ultimately the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also denied relief.
Teague then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court,

212.
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215.
216.
217.
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221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 322-23.
See supra notes 54-55.
Johnson, 479 U.S. at 323.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 328.
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled in parton other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
People v. Teague, 439 N.E.2d 1066, 1068 (1M.App. Ct. 1982).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 288.
Id. at 293.
Teague v. Illinois, 464 U.S. 867 (1983) (denying certiorari of state direct appeal).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 293.
Id. at 294.
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asking the Court, among other things, to hear his claim that the jury selection
process in his case violated Batson v. Kentucky225 and that the jury in his criminal
trial had not been selected in accordance with the fair cross section requirement of
the Sixth Amendment.226 The Supreme Court agreed to hear Teague's case.
However, rather than reach the merits of Teague's constitutional claims, the Court,
without the benefit of briefing or oral argument by the parties,227 crafted a new
retroactivity doctrine that the Court then used to deny relief and review to Teague' s
claims.228
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice O'Connor faced two retroactivity
questions in Teague: (1) whether Batson v. Kentucky should be extended retroactively to Teague's habeas petition, 229 and (2) whether the Court should even
consider Teague' s Sixth Amendment fair cross section claim. 230 The Batson question
could be answered by a fairly straightforward application of prior case law on this
issue. The second question allowed the Court to craft a broad, new rule of retroactivity with far-reaching effects on the scope of habeas corpus review.
The Court's examination of Teague' s Batson claim was fairly straightforward. In
Batson v. Kentucky,23 1 the Court adopted a new standard for determining whether
a prosecutor had engaged in purposeful discrimination in the jury selection process,
which replaced the previous method that the Court had established in Swain v.
Alabama.232 In 1986, in Allen v. Hardy,23 3 the Court found that Batson constituted
a clear break with precedent and, applying the Linkletter analysis, declined to apply
Batson to cases that were final when Batson was decided. 23' Teague's case became
final in 1983, three years before Batson, and it appeared that under Allen v. Hardy
he was not entitled to have Batson apply to his case. 235 However, Teague argued that
McCray v. New York23 6 should instead mark the emergence of the new rule on the
jury selection process.237 If McCray marked the new rule, then Teague would benefit
from the change in the law because his case was pending on direct appeal at the time
of McCray. McCray, however, was not a full Court opinion, but rather an order
denying certiorari, in which several justices wrote as to the certiorari denial.238
Teague argued that the justices' writings in McCray marked the beginning of the

225. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
226. Teague, 489 U.S. at 288.
227. Id. at 326 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Justice O'Connor noted in her plurality opinion, id. at 300, an
amicus brief filed by the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation urged some of the retroactivity arguments embraced
by the plurality in Teague.
228. Id. at 301-02.
229. Id. at 295-96.

230. Id. at 299.
231.

476 U.S. 79 (1986).

232. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruledby Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
233. 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (per curiam).
234. Id. at 258-60.
235. Teague v. Illinois, 464 U.S. 867 (1983) (denying writ of certiorari to the Appellate Court of Illinois).
236. 461 U.S. 961 (1983) (denying certiorari in a memorandum order).
237. Teague, 489 U.S. at 296.
238. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from the certiorari denial and indicated that the old rule forjury
selection as articulated in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), should be reexamined. McCray, 461 U.S. at 966.
Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Powell, while concurring in the denial of certiorari, stated the issue of Swain's
viability was an important one. Id. at 962.
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rule eventually established in Batson.239 The Court, however, rejected Teague's
effort to trace the rule articulated in Batson to the certiorari denial in McCray and
found that, under Allen v. Hardy,Teague was not entitled to the benefit of Batson.2 °
This analysis, while raising some questions about when a new rule comes into
existence, did not require a re-crafting of the Linkletter analysis.
Teague's fair cross section claim presented the Court with a different question
and, as it turned out, an opportunity to not only revisit the retroactivity doctrine of
Linkletter, but also to radically change the face of modem habeas corpus. According
to Justice O'Connor, Teague, in his fair cross section claim, was asking the Court
to create a new rule of law extending the fair cross section requirement of Taylor v.
Louisiana24 to petit juries.242 While several justices disagreed with Justice
O'Connor's claim that Teague was asking the Court to craft a new rule,243 Justice
O'Connor used this characterization of Teague' s claim to overturn Linkletter, craft
a new retroactivity rule, and dramatically limit the scope of the writ of habeas
corpus.
In her plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor established two important components
of the Court's current retroactivity analysis: (1) when a new rule may be applied to
cases that are final and on habeas review, 2" and (2) what issues a petitioner may
raise in his habeas petition.245 These are corollary concerns that limit the claims a
habeas petitioner may pursue in federal court.
A. BarringRetroactive Application of New Rules of Law to Cases That Are Final
and Pending in HabeasReview
For a number of years prior to Teague, various members of the Court, as well as
commentators and scholars, 2' had been expressing concerns about the Linkletteri
Stovall analysis. As suggested in Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Griffith,
several of the justices were inclined to follow Justice Harlan's views on retroactivity. Interestingly, in Griffith, where the Court applied Justice Harlan's retroactivity analysis with respect to direct appeals, Justice O'Connor dissented and
joined Justice White in observing that the Linkletter/Stovall model was workable. 247
Nonetheless, in Teague, a majority of the Court, including Justice O'Connor,
embraced Justice Harlan's ideas, although only a plurality of the Court agreed with
Justice O'Connor's reworking of the Harlan approach.
In abandoning Linkletter, Justice O'Connor turned the focus of retroactivity away
from the purpose of the new rule, its degree of predictability, and the state's reliance

239. Teague, 489 U.S. at 295-96.
240. This part of Teague v. Lane, 289 U.S. at 296, suggests some of the potential problems, or at least
ambiguities, involved in discerning what is a new rule and where and how to mark it.
241. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
242. Teague, 489 U.S. at 299.
243. Id. at 341-42.
244. Id. at 300-16.
245. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 15.5.1, at 897-905.
246. See, e.g., Haddad, supra note 152; Corr, supra note 18, at 746; Beytagh, supra note 147; James B.
Haddad, "Retroactivity Should Be Rethought": A Call for the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 417, 424-41 (1969).
247. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 330-32.
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interest; she instead focused on the role of the writ of habeas corpus in the criminal
justice system, tailoring the doctrine of retroactivity to meet her views of the writ's
function and purpose.248 In important respects, Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice
Harlan that the purpose of the writ was not to assure a trial free of constitutional
error;2' rather, she indicated that the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus was to
deter misconduct by courts and police." 0 Referring to Justice Harlan's writings,
Justice O'Connor noted that federal courts meet this deterrence purpose by assuring
that the trial adheres to the constitutional rules in effect at the time of the trial; the
deterrence purpose was not served by applying new rules retroactively. 21 However,
in contrast to Justice Harlan, Justice O'Connor appeared to countenance only the
deterrence function of the writ. While advocating a fairly circumscribed role for the
writ, Justice Harlan, like Professor Mishkin, nonetheless recognized that deterrence
was not the only value advanced by the writ of habeas corpus; the writ also advances
liberty interests, including assuring fundamental fairness in the criminal process.252
In Teague, Justice O'Connor focused on counterbalancing the deterrence value
of the writ with other societal concerns.253 In particular, she stressed the importance
of finality in criminal justice, which the writ undermined, and she emphasized the
interests of comity and federalism, which she believed restricted the scope of the
writ. 1 4 In this regard, she stated:
Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction
became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to
the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law
is deprived of much of its deterrent effect. The fact that life and liberty are at
stake in criminal prosecutions "shows only that 'conventional notions of finality'
much place in criminal as in civil litigation, not that they
should not have as255
should have none."

Justice O'Connor further opined:
"[C]osts imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of
constitutional law on habeas corpus... generally far outweigh the benefits of this
application." In many ways the application of new rules to cases on collateral
review may be more intrusive than the enjoining of criminal prosecutions, for
it continually forces the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison
defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional
standards.

256

248. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 308.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 306.
251. See id. at 305-07.
252. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969).
253. 489 U.S. at 308.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 309 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 150 (1970)).
256. Id. at 310 (citations omitted) (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984)) (alterations in
original).
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Having endorsed, at least in part, Justice Harlan's view of habeas corpus, his
concern about the finality of state judgments, and his corresponding conclusion to
limit new rules in habeas, Justice O'Connor abandoned the Linkletter model and
structured the modern retroactivity rule: "Unless they fall within an exception to the
general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable
257
to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.
There would be no balancing of the purpose of the rule and the reliance interest in
the old rule. It would be a clear black and white test; if it is a new rule, it will not be
applied to convictions and sentences that are final. The rationale for this change
from the Linkletter formula was the conclusion that retroactivity should be based on
whether a case is on direct appeal or is pending in a collateral review proceeding,
rather than on the nature and purpose of the rule. 258 This way of looking at the
retroactivity problem means that, at least initially, the purpose of the new rule is not
relevant to the question of its retroactive application.
While Teague created a clear bright line test barring application of new rules to
decisions that are final, the Teague Court, like Justice Harlan, appeared to grant a
concession to the idea that the purpose and function of some new rules might
nonetheless compel their retroactive application to cases pending in habeas review.
Reworking Justice Harlan's exceptions, the Court in Teague crafted two exceptions
to its retroactivity bar that are similar to, but more limited than, those advocated by
Justice Harlan.
The first exception established by Teague allowed a new rule to be applied to all
cases, regardless of the date of finality, if the new rule "places 'certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe." 25 9 Since Teague, the Court has indicated also that decisions
that place a certain class of persons outside of a state's power to punish would fit
within this exception." For example, Atkins v. Virginia,26' in which the Court held
that mentally retarded criminal defendants cannot be subjected to the death penalty,
arguably would fit under the first exception.262 Likewise, if the Court were to decide
that juveniles who are under the age of eighteen at the time they commit a capital
offense cannot be sentenced to death, that decision would also arguably fall within
this exception.263 Clearly, this set of cases is extremely limited.
The second Teague exception conflates the two different constructs that Justice
Harlan offered with respect to his second exception. In Desist, Justice Harlan
suggested an exception to the bar on retroactive application of new rules if the new

257. Id.
258.

Fisch, supra note 6.

259. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)).
260. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 339 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
261. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Atkins overturned Penry to the extent that Penry allowed states to execute mentally
retarded criminal defendants.
262. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 330; see also, e.g., Hearn v. Dretke, 376 F.3d 447, 455 n. 11 (5th Cir. 2004); In
re Hicks, 375 F.3d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004); In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1172 (11th Cir. 2003); Hill v.
Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 2002). But see Noel v. Norris, 335 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
263. See Roper v. Simmons, 124 S. Ct. 1171 (2004) (granting certiorari in a memorandum order).
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rule advances the truth-finding function of the judicial process.2 4 However, in
Mackey, Justice Harlan shifted away from that test and focused on allowing an
exception for new rules that create procedures that "are 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."' 2 65 Justice O'Connor combined the two exceptions to create the
impenetrable second exception to the Teague retroactivity bar: a new rule will be
applied retroactively if (1) it is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," meaning
it announces a bedrock principle of law, and (2) it affects the truth-finding function
of the criminal process.2
Like its predecessors, the Teague retroactivity paradigm is triggered by a new
rule.267 In Teague, Justice O'Connor gave varying descriptions of what constitutes
a new rule. She described a new rule as one that constitutes "[a] clear break with the
past' 268 or, "[t]o put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became
'
On the other hand, Justice O'Connor stated that a case did not create a new
final."269
rule where it merely applied an earlier principle.27 ° The scope and meaning of the
term "new rule" was left vague and malleable.
Although Justice O'Connor's opinion in Teague was a plurality opinion, it has
gained majority acceptance and is the retroactivity rule that controls today.27' One
issue that Justice O'Connor specifically avoided addressing in Teague was the
question of whether the Court's newly created retroactivity analysis applied to
capital sentencing proceedings.272 However, only four months after Teague, in Penry
v. Lynaugh,273 a majority of the Court, again without having the benefit of briefing
by the parties, ruled that the Teague retroactivity analysis applied to capital
sentencing proceedings.274 In reaching this conclusion, the Court simply stated, "In
our view, the finality concerns underlying Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity
are applicable in the capital sentencing context, as are the two exceptions to his
general rule of nonretroactivity. ' '275 The Penry Court did not weigh or discuss the
different finality, due process, or fairness issues that may exist in death penalty
cases. Responding in his separate opinion in Penry, Justice Brennan opined:
This extension [of Teague to capital sentencing] means that a person may be
killed although he or she has a sound constitutional claim that would have barred

his or her execution had this Court only announced the constitutional rule before
his or her conviction and sentence became final. It is intolerable that the
difference between life and death should turn on such a fortuity of timing, and
beyond my comprehension that a majority of this Court will so blithely allow a

264. See supra notes 164, 194, and accompanying text.

265. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)).
266. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-13 (1988).

267. Id. at 293 (considering Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
268. Id. at 304.
269. Id. at 301.

270. Id. at 307.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See supra note 220.
Teague, 389 U.S. at 314 n.2.
492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled in part on othergrounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 314.

275. Id.
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State to take a human life though the method by which sentence was determined
violates our Constitution.276

These concerns have continued to surface over the past fifteen years of the Teague
doctrine.
B. Ability to Raise PotentiallyNew or Novel Claims on HabeasReview: The
Second Retroactivity Limit of Teague
As far-reaching as the above-discussed Teague retroactivity doctrine is, the Court
reached a second issue in Teague that also had a tremendous impact on habeas litigation. The second major issue addressed by the Teague Court concerned the ability
of habeas petitioners to even raise new or novel questions of law in a habeas
petition.277

In initiating her break with the Linkletter doctrine, Justice O'Connor announced
that the question of retroactivity is a threshold question to be determined before a
court may decide the merits of a petitioner's claim.278 Under the Linkletter model,
the Court could, and did, create new rules of constitutional criminal procedure based
on claims raised in habeas petitions.279 Teague stopped this practice and held that

"habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure unless those rules would be applied retroactively to all defen2' 80
dants on collateral review through one of the two exceptions we have articulated.
Using the Griffith v. Kentucky 28 ' rationale, which assured all defendants on direct
appeal the benefit of new rules, the Court now cut off new constitutional claims for
habeas petitioners, reasoning that to allow one habeas
petitioner to receive the
28 2
benefit of a new rule, but not others, would be unfair.
This aspect of Teague, in which the Court forbade habeas petitioners from raising
novel or new rules, raises some interesting questions. First, Teague requires the
Court to determine at the outset of its review of a case if a habeas petitioner is
seeking a new rule, and only if the Court concludes that the petitioner is not seeking
a new rule may the Court review the merits of the claim. It is curious how the Court
can make this prediction before engaging in a thorough analysis of the rule. For
example, how does the Court decide at the outset whether its decision will simply
be an application of precedent to new or novel circumstances, or whether its
decision will overturn a precedent and create a new rule? Does the Court base its
conclusion on the petitioner's and respondent's briefs, or on the arguments in the

276. Id. at 341. Other commentators have expressed deep concerns about applying Teague to capital
sentencing proceedings, where the punishment is irrevocable. See, e.g., David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The
Impact of CurrentRetroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 23 (1992); Karl N.
Metzner, Note, Retroactivity, Habeas Corpus, and the Death Penalty: An Unholy Alliance, 41 DuKE L.J. 160
(1991). Contra Paul J. Heald, Retroactivity,CapitalSentencing, and the JurisdictionalContours ofHabeas Corpus,
42 ALA. L. REv. 1273 (1991).
277. Teague, 489 U.S. at 319.
278. Id. at 300-01.
279. See id. at 334-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing a number of habeas cases in which the Court crafted
new rules of law); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 15.5.1, at 897-99, 898 n.10.
280. Teague, 489 U.S. at 316.
281. 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).
282. Teague, 489 U.S. at 305.
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amicus briefs? Should the Court fully analyze the problem, reach a conclusion of
the Court
law, and then determine whether that conclusion is new law? If so, should
283
then decline to discuss or rule on the issue in a habeas proceeding?
These legal gymnastics plainly restrict a petitioner's ability to seek habeas relief.
However, the impact of this rule is greater than just its impact on individual criminal
defendants. In fact, not only does this aspect of Teague cut off relief on novel claims
for habeas petitioners, but it also greatly reduces the number of cases in which the
Court will have an opportunity to craft new rules, and it eliminates a previously
available federal forum in which state prisoners may argue for new federal procedural rules. 284 As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court has sole discretion to hear
a case from a state court on direct appeal,2 85 and, given the Court's limited docket,
not many cases reach the Court on direct appeal. If habeas is no longer an avenue
for the establishment of new rules, only those few direct appeal cases in which the
Court grants certiorari will be available for the development of criminal procedure
rules.
V. FROM TEAGUETO SCHRIRO V. SUMMERLIN AND BEARD V. BANKS:
FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE TEAGUE PARADIGM
The impact of the Teague doctrine on the development of criminal law and on
habeas corpus litigation cannot be overstated. Teague dealt not simply with retroactivity, that is, how law is made and how changes in the law affect litigants; it also
addressed the role of the writ of habeas corpus in criminal justice and the issue of
what constitutional protections are available to habeas petitioners. Over the past
fifteen years, the Court has vigorously used the Teague retroactivity doctrine to
circumscribe the writ. In accord with the Court's campaign to limit habeas review
by application of the Teague doctrine,286 Congress incorporated concepts from
Teague in the AEDPA 7 the modem habeas statute. To understand what the Court
has done with Teague and how it has strayed from traditional concerns of
retroactivity, as well as the habeas concerns expressed by Justice Harlan, requires
a study of several aspects of Teague. The first issue is the Court's interpretation of
the term "new rule," which is the threshold question that determines which cases are
subject to Teague limitations. The second issue concerns the scope or understanding
of which cases fall within a Teague exception or otherwise are not subject to
Teague. Examining a slightly different aspect of the impact of Teague, this Article
then will look at the relationship between the Teague doctrine and the AEDPA.

283. The Court continues to grapple with these questions as seen in the dissenting opinions in Beard v. Banks,
124 S. Ct. 2504 (2004). See id. at 2515-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2517-18 (Souter, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the difficulties in defining a new rule, see A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of "New
Rules'"and the Antiterrorism and Effective DeathPenalty Act, 70 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 9-15 (2002); Dow, supra
note 276, at 36-38; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1816-17.
284. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 15.5, at 896-905.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
286. The Teague retroactivity doctrine is not the only procedural device effectively used by the Court to limit
the relief that may be granted by the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)
(using procedural bar doctrine to prevent federal habeas review of claims raised by capital defendant).
287. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
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Finally, the culmination of Teague as expressed by the Court in its 2003-2004 Term
will be considered.
A. Decisions Subject to the Teague Analysis: The Meaning of "New Rule"
As discussed earlier, doctrines limiting the retroactive effect of court decisions
only come into play when the Court issues a new rule.2 8 This structure makes sense
when considering the factors that trigger a perceived need for a doctrine limiting
retroactivity. For example, one reason for a doctrine limiting retroactivity is the
recognition that significant changes in the law or the judicial creation of new law
upsets established expectations and undermines stability.2 89 Moreover, the move
away from the Blackstone model of complete retroactivity stems from a recognition
that the Court does more than discover the law. On occasion, it also creates the
law. 2' This creative activity, which arguably may be described as quasi-legislative
in character, is one of the reasons that many scholars and jurists believe it is
appropriate to limit the retroactive application of new rules that upset the parties'
expectations. 29 However, when the Court engages in applying precedent to new
circumstances, or in expounding on established law, the concerns regarding the
parties' expectations, stability, and the role of the Court do not dictate limits on
retroactive application. Indeed, this activity falls well within the traditional role of
judicial decision making and is not outside parties' expectations.292 To the contrary,
to deny a party the application of precedent or established law would undermine
expectations of what the law is and what it protects. Because of this critical
distinction, the first question
in any retroactivity analysis is: does the decision at
293
issue create a new rule?
Justice Harlan, in his separate opinions in Desist and Mackey, recognized the
difficulty in determining when a case creates a new rule but indicated that this
difficulty should not be too troubling because most cases would not involve the
creation of new rules. 294 Intuitively, this conclusion seems correct, as the term "new"
is synonymous with the term "novel," and "new" has been defined as "never

288. See supra notes 130, 199-200 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 6, at 1058; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1757.
290. See supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
291. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 1058; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1759.
292. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,263-64 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Bryant, supra
note 283, at 9-15; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1816-19.
293. Justice Scalia previously described the three-step process that the Court traditionally uses to determine
whether a claim raised on habeas review is based on a new rule that should be applied retroactively:
To apply Teague, a federal court engages in a three-step process. First, it determines the date
upon which the defendant's conviction became final. Second, it must "'[slurvefy] the legal
landscape as it then existed,' and 'determine whether a state court considering [the defendant's]
claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent
to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution."' Finally, if the court
determines that the habeas petitioner seeks the benefit of a new rule, the court must consider
whether the relief sought falls within one of the two narrow exceptions to nonretroactivity.
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997) (citations omitted) (quoting Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390
(1994) (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,468 (1993) (alterations in original); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,
488 (1990) (alterations in original))).
294. See supra notes 169-204 and accompanying text.

Winter 2005]

RETROACTIVITY PARADIGM

existing before." '95 Teague ventured that a new rule could be found when a decision
'
"imposes a new obligation on the States, '2 97 or where the
"breaks new ground,"296
result of a particular case "was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant's conviction became final., 298 As will be seen, this language in Teague
offered the Court an avenue to expand the new rule definition to encompass all types
of uncontroversial court decisions.
In the fifteen years since Teague, the Court has taken the concept of the new rule
doctrine to extreme forms. 299 The first move in this direction occurred the year after
Teague in Butler v. McKellar."° In Butler, the Court faced the question of whether
its decision two years earlier in Arizona v. Roberson"' was a new rule subject to the
retroactivity restrictions of Teague. Roberson dealt with the application of Edwards
v. Arizona30 2 to a different factual setting. In Edwards, the Court held that a suspect
who had invoked the right to counsel could not be subjected to a second
interrogation until counsel had been made available. The issue in Roberson was
whether Edwards applied when the second interrogation concerned a separate
offense.3" 3 The Court in Roberson, by a six-to-two vote, 3°4 found that the precedents
of Miranda v. Arizona30 5 and Edwards, as well as a number of other decisions,
plainly supported the conclusion that the Edwards rule did apply when the second
interrogation concerned a separate offense.3°" The language and tone of Roberson
easily suggested that Roberson did not break with precedent, but rather was an
application of well-established rules to a different factual situation.30 7 It would seem,
then, that Roberson would be the type of decision that did not constitute a new rule.
In a counter-intuitive move, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was one of the two
dissenters in Roberson, classified Roberson as a new rule subject to Teague
limitations.30 8 In Butler v. McKellar,3° Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, found that the concept of a new rule was not about how the Court creates
law or applies precedent as much as it was about protecting a state court's
"reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents," even if the state
court's interpretation of the law is "shown to be contrary to later decisions.,, 3 0 The
new rule prong of Teague thus transformed the definition and purpose of the "new

295. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 957 (2d College ed. 1984).

296. 489 U.S. at 301.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Early on, several scholars noted the potential impact of Teague on the scope of habeas. See Dow, supra
note 276; Heald, supra note 276.
300. 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
301. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
302. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
303. Roberson, 480 U.S. at 677.
304. Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy dissented;
Justice O'Connor did not participate.

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Roberson, 486 U.S. at 680-85.
See Heald, supra note 276, at 1283-85; Metzner, supra note 276, at 170-75.
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990).
494 U.S. 407 (1990).
Id. at414.
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rule" doctrine.31 ' The doctrine is not about the scope of the Blackstone model of
judicial decision making; it is not about the process of judicial interpretation of the
law; it is not about a decision that overturns or upsets established rules of law.
Rather, the new rule concept now protects a state court's reasonable expectations
when interpreting the Federal Constitution, even if the state's interpretation of the
Constitution is wrong. t2 This protection of the state's interest in interpreting the
Constitution, even in a manner that ultimately proves to be incorrect, is curious
considering that for well over 150 years it has been an expectation and, indeed, a
fundamental constitutional principle that the Federal Constitution, and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution, prevail over conflicting or inconsistent
state law, including state court interpretations of the Federal Constitution.3 3
In its endeavor to protect a state's interpretations of federal law, the Court
instructed in Butler that, if the outcome of a case such as Roberson is "susceptible
to debate among reasonable minds," it may be categorized as a new rule and thus is
subject to Teague.3" 4 Along the same lines, a majority of the Court stated in Saffle
v. Parks315 that a decision is new unless a state court would have felt "compelled by
existing precedent ' 316 to reach the same conclusion ultimately reached by the
Supreme Court. Even a Supreme Court decision issued in a summary, per curiam
opinion applying established law can be characterized as new.317 Under Teague, a
state has a reasonable expectation that its erroneous interpretation of the law will be
protected unless precedent compels the interpretation of the law ultimately found to
be correct.31 This formulation of a new rule deviates markedly from Justice
Harlan's view that most decisions do not create new rules, 3" and completely breaks
with Blackstone's conception of the law and the function of the courts.320 Under the
Teague doctrine, the presumption is that a decision is a new rule unless precedent
compels the decision.
Moreover, the habeas petitioner now has the burden of showing that the decision
is not a new rule.32' As the Court said in O'Dell v. Netherland,322 "we will not disturb a final state conviction or sentence unless it can be said that a state court, at the
time the conviction or sentence became final, would have acted objectively unreasonably by not extending the relief later sought in federal court. ' 323 Thus, the test for

311. Even the leading proponents of the positivist theories, which recognized the judicial creation of new law,
recommend that judges hold closely to precedent, law, and policy in deciding cases. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note
6; see also Bryant, supra note 283, at 10-11; Heald, supra note 276, at 1283-84; Metzner, supra note 276, at
170-75.
312. See Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990); Butler v.
McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1990).
313. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
314. Butler, 494 U.S. at415.
315. 494 U.S. 484,488 (1990).
316. Id.
317. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997).
318. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488.
319. See supranotes 168-201 and accompanying text.
320. See supranotes 20-43 and accompanying text.
321. O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997). The state may waive Teague by not raising it as an issue,
although federal courts may still apply Teague even if it has been waived. Caspari v. Bolen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994).
322. 521 U.S. 151 (1997).
323. Id. at 156.
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whether a decision articulates a new rule is "whether a state court considering [the
defendant's] claim.. .would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude
that the rule [sought] was required by the Constitution."324 Meeting this test is a
formidable task. For example, the Court indicated in O'Dell that if a court's decision
is based on reasoning by a plurality of the Court, then that decision could not have
been compelled by precedent and could be classified as new.325 Likewise, if, prior
to the Court's issuance of a decision, state or federal courts issued differing opinions
about a particular rule or doctrine, then the Supreme Court's decision resolving that
conflict could be classified as new.326 Given the role of the Supreme Court in our
nation's judicial structure as the court that resolves conflicts and confusions in
federal law, it is hard to imagine any case that the Supreme Court selects for review
that would not result in a new decision.
Moreover, under Teague, not only will a habeas petitioner not receive the benefit
of new rules rendered since the petitioner's conviction and sentence became final,
but also the Court cannot even consider a claim that might result in a new rule.327 So,
for example, it would appear that a petitioner who is requesting an application of
established law to novel or even slightly different factual circumstances would be
unable to receive federal habeas review of such a claim.32
Not surprisingly, commentators and scholars have criticized the Court's construction of the new rule doctrine.3 29 The doctrine makes nearly every Court decision
a new rule, which is counter to well-established ideas about the function of the Court
in both a jurisprudential and a constitutional sense. 3 ° It also creates a degree of
deference to state courts that, in a very real way, deprives habeas petitioners of a
federal forum to independently review their constitutional claims and deprives
federal courts of the ability to apply changes, improvements, and innovations in
constitutional law to state prisoners.
B. The Teague Exceptions and Limitations
As noted earlier, if a decision does not create a new rule, then that decision
applies to all cases regardless of their temporal relationship to the issuance of the
decision.33' If the Court does issue a new rule (and under the Teague construction
of new rule almost every decision is potentially a new rule), then that new rule will
not apply retroactively to cases that are final at the time the rule is handed down
unless the new rule fits under one of the two Teague exceptions.332 While the origins
of the Teague exceptions suggest a small umbrella of protection for criminal
324. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997) (quoting Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)
(quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990)) (first alteration in original)).
325. 521 U.S. at 159.
326. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992).
327. See supra notes 229-245 and accompanying text.
328. Interestingly, the Supreme Court, in habeas reviews in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), and
Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (2003), applied a standard of effectiveness for trial counsel in capital sentencing
proceedings that Justice Scalia characterized as new.
329. For discussions on the shortcomings and problems with the Court's "new rule" formulation, see Fallon
& Meltzer, supra note 6; Heald, supra note 276; Bryant, supra note 283; Metzner, supra note 276.
330. See supra notes 19-43 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
332. See infra notes 464-489 and accompanying text.
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defendants, the Court has interpreted the exceptions so narrowly as to render them
virtually non-existent.
The first Teague exception applies a new rule retroactively if it places "certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe., 333 This exception was derived from Justice Harlan's
separate opinions in Desist and Mackey, in which Justice Harlan explained the first
exception as follows:
New "substantive due process" rules, that is, those that place, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe, must, in my
view, be placed on a different footing [than new rules of procedural
law] .... [T]he writ has historically been available for attacking convictions on
such grounds.3
In Penry v. Lynaugh,335 the Court explained its understanding of this exception
in the context of the Court's decisions protecting certain individuals from the death
penalty:
In our view, a new rule placing a certain class of individuals beyond the State's
power to punish by death is analogous to a new rule placing certain conduct
beyond the State's power to punish at all. In both cases, the Constitution itself
deprives the State of the power to impose a certain penalty, and the finality and
comity concerns underlying Justice Harlan's view of retroactivity have little
force. As Justice Harlan wrote: "There is little societal interest in permitting the
criminal process to rest at a point where it ought properly never to repose."
Therefore, the first exception set forth in Teague should be understood to cover
not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but
also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants
because of their status or offense.336
Thus, new rules prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on a class of
individuals, such as those with mental retardation, should apply retroactively to all
cases regardless of when the defendant's conviction and sentence became final.
Outside of this type of case, the Court has not found any case within this exception.
The second exception in Teague is, if possible, more limited than the first
exception. By combining the requirement that a new rule must be a bedrock rule of
law and must enhance the truth-finding process,337 the Court has crafted an
exception so narrow that no case-not one-from 1989 to 2004 has been found to
fall within it. Indeed, in Teague the Court remarked:
Because we operate from the premise that such procedures would be so central
to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that
many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge. We are also of
the view that such rules are "best illustrated by recalling the classic grounds for

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692).
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692-93 (footnote omitted).
492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 330 (citation omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 264-272.
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the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus-that the proceeding was dominated by
mob violence; that the prosecutor knowingly made use of perjured testimony;
or that the conviction was based on a confession extorted from the defendant by
brutal methods."33
Since 1989, 33 9 the Court has handed down important rules of criminal procedure

such as those found in Simmons v. South Carolina,4 which provides that, where the
state raises the issue of future dangerousness in a capital sentencing proceeding, the
defendant has the right to rebut with evidence that he or she will be ineligible for
parole if sentenced to life imprisonment, 34' and Caldwell v. Mississippi,342 which
found it unconstitutional to allow jurors to return a death sentence where the jury
had been led to believe that responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
defendant's death sentence rested elsewhere. 34 3 Despite the crucial role such rules
play in determining the fairness and appropriateness of the death penalty, the Court
has refused to apply either of these rules retroactively.' 4
The Court has carved out one other class of cases that fall outside of the
retroactivity constraints of Teague. Bousley v. United States,45 an opinion authored
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, found that "decisions of this Court holding that a
substantive federal criminal statute does not reach certain conduct, like decisions
placing conduct 'beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,' necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of 'an
act that the law does not make criminal.-' 34 6 Thus, when the Court interprets a
substantive provision of a federal criminal statute and finds that congress exceeded
its authority in proscribing certain conduct, "it would be inconsistent with the
doctrinal underpinnings of habeas review to preclude [a] petitioner" from relying on
that Court decision in seeking habeas relief.347 Bousely appeared to provide that
changes in substantive law would not be subject to the Teague analysis and, as such,
substantive decisions would apply to cases pending in habeas review.
C. Incorporationof the Language and Ideas of Teague in the AEDPA
One of the intended and most striking results of Teague was its impact on the
scope of the writ of habeas corpus: it drastically reduced the issues and claims that
could be heard in habeas litigation. This impact on the writ did not pass unnoticed.

338. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 544 (1982) (footnotes omitted)).
339. Of course, the opportunities for the Court to establish new rules of criminal procedure have been greatly
circumscribed since Teague. See supra notes 279-283 and accompanying text.
340. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
341. Id. at 171.
342. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
343. See id. at 341.
344. See O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997) (refusing to characterize Simmons, 512 U.S. 154, as a
bedrock rule falling within second exception); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (refusing to characterize
Caldwell, 472 U.S. 320, as a bedrock rule falling within second exception).
345. 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
346. Id. at 620 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 312 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692); Davis v. United States,
417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)).
347. Id. at 621.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

Not only did scholars and commentators observe its effects,348 but also Congress
noticed how Teague became an instrument for limiting the writ and for curtailing
the power of federal courts in habeas review.
During the mid-1990s, a number of factors, including concerns about delays in
the imposition of the death penalty, the rising interest in states' rights, and the
bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, sparked interest in and
garnered enough support for a revamping of the federal habeas statute. 349 The
AEDPA, which was enacted in April of 1996, dramatically refashioned the federal
habeas corpus statute. Making many amendments to the previous habeas statute,
Congress used concepts and incorporated language from Teague in several specific
attempts to restrict the scope of habeas review. For example, 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(2)(A), which restricts the filing of second or successive habeas petitions,
specifically provides that a second or successive petition cannot be heard on a new
rule of law unless the Supreme Court has made that new law retroactive.
Another notable incorporation of Teague is seen in the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d), which provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States, or
(2) resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.35°
In this provision, which greatly restricts federal court review of state court deci" ' Congress borrowed the concept of the new rule doctrine to protect a state's
sions,35
reasonable expectation that it will be allowed to interpret constitutional law as it sees
fit, even if the state's interpretation of federal law is incorrect, provided that a contrary interpretation is not compelled by precedent. Likewise, section 2254(d)(1)

348. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 15.2, at 869-73; Dow, supra note 276, at 49-50; Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 6, at 1746-49; Heald, supranote 276, at 1303.
349. See Entzeroth, supranote 83.
350. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
351. As the Supreme Court explained in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (alteration in
original) (quoting § 2254(d)(1)):
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a
state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the
merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two
conditions is satisfied-the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary
to.. clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,"
or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of.. clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas
court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this
Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on
a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle
from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's
case.
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requires federal court deference to a state court decision provided the state court
decision is "not contrary to," or "an unreasonable application of... clearly established
federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 352 Like Teague, section
2254(d)(1) protects a state court's interpretation of Supreme Court precedent even
when the state court is wrong in its judgment of those precedents. In this respect,
section 2254 codifies the definition of new rule. In keeping with the new rule
doctrine, the Supreme Court has made clear in Teague, and in its interpretation of
section 2254, that a federal court is not empowered to grant habeas relief simply
because the federal court finds the state court misapplied or incorrectly interpreted
federal law; rather, habeas relief is proper only when the state got the law wrong and
that wrong interpretation of law was unreasonable or contrary to established law.353
Although section 2254 incorporated much of the Teague doctrine, it did not
render Teague ineffective. To the contrary, the Court has made clear that the Teague
analysis is still an independent doctrine that must be applied before habeas review
may begin. Specifically, in 2002, in Horn v. Banks,3M the Court stated:
While it is of course a necessary prerequisite to federal habeas relief that a prisoner satisfy the AEDPA standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
("[a)n application.. .shall not be granted.. .unless" the AEDPA standard of
review is satisfied), none of our post-AEDPA cases have suggested that a writ
of habeas corpus should automatically issue if a prisoner satisfies the AEDPA
standard, or that AEDPA relieves courts from the responsibility of addressing
properly raised Teague arguments. To the contrary, if our post-AEDPA cases
suggest anything about AEDPA's relationship to Teague, it is that the AEDPA
and Teague inquiries are distinct. Thus, in addition to performing any analysis
required by AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas petition must conduct
a threshold Teague analysis when the issue is properly raised by the state.355
Thus, all habeas petitioners face the hurdle of Teague as well as the procedural
hurdles of the AEDPA.
VI. TEAGUE IN THE SUPREME COURT'S 2003-2004 TERM: BEARD V.
BANKS AND SUMMERLIN V. SCHRIRO
In its 2003-2004 Term, the Supreme Court applied Teague in two key death
penalty cases and considered the scope of the new rule doctrine and the Teague
exceptions and limitations. Both of these cases evidence the extraordinary restraints
that Teague has placed on habeas petitioners and provide some insight into future
cases.

352. For an excellent and thought-provoking article on the relationship between Teague and section 2254,
see Bryant, supra note 283.
353. Todd E. Pettys, FederalHabeasReliefand the New Tolerancefor "ReasonablyErroneous"Applications
of FederalLaw, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 750 (2002) ("Under § 2254(d)(1)'s 'unreasonable application' clause, ... a
federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that
the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that
application must also be unreasonable.").
354. 536 U.S. 266 (2002) (per curian).
355. Id. at 272 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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A. Beard v. Banks: The ExtraordinarilyExpansive Reach of the New Rule
Doctrine
One of the Court's most recent applications of Teague occurred in Beard v.
357 was
Banks356 in which the Court faced the question of whether Mills v. Maryland
a new rule. In 1988, before the Supreme Court had issued its landmark decisions in
Teague and Penry, the Supreme Court declared in Mills that a capital sentencing
proceeding is constitutionally defective if there exists a substantial probability that
jurors believed they were required to unanimously agree on the existence of particular mitigating evidence before they could consider such evidence in deciding
whether a defendant should be punished by death.35 In 1990, in McKoy v. North
Carolina,359 a majority of the Court applied the principles of Mills to hold that North
Carolina's requirement thatjurors must unanimously agree on mitigating factors was
unconstitutional. 361 In Mills, Justice Blackmun, writing for a five-member majority,
stated:
It is beyond dispute that in a capital case "'the sentencer [may] not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigatingfactor,any aspect of a defendant's character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
as a basis for a sentence less than death."' The corollary that "the sentencer may
not refuse to consider or be precludedfrom considering 'any relevant mitigating
evidence"' is equally "well established.

36

'

The ideas articulated in Mills stem from the Court's 1978 decision in Lockett v.
Ohio 62 and its 1982 decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma.3 63 Both Lockett and Eddings
rely on well-entrenched principles of modem death penalty jurisprudence.3
When the Supreme Court established the modem death penalty jurisprudence, it
mandated that (1) the jury's decision to impose the death penalty must be
sufficiently directed and guided in the selection of individuals who may be subject
to the death penalty36 5 and (2) the jury must be allowed to hear relevant evidence,
including mitigating evidence such as the "character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense, ' 366 to determine ultimately

356. 124 S.Ct. 2504 (2004).
357. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
358. Mills was decided by a five-member majority. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
and Scalia dissented.
359. 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
360. Id. at 444.
361. Mills, 486 U.S. at 374-75 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 114 (1982) (quoting
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion), and citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4
(1986)).
362. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
363. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
364. In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972), a divided Supreme Court struck down then-existing
death penalty systems across the United States. In 1976, the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions, sanctioned
certain death penalty statutes. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976), vacated, Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (disapproving death penalty procedure but sanctioning alternative); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (disapproving death penalty procedure but sanctioning alternative). See generally
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 56.

365. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188, 192-93.
366. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
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if a particular defendant should be put to death.3 67 In 1978, in Lockett, the Supreme
Court reinforced the importance of mitigating evidence in the death sentencing
process, stating:
[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as
a basis for a sentence less than death."'
In reaching this decision, the Court relied not only on the 1976 decision of Gregg
v. Georgia369 and its companion cases, 370 which established the modem death
penalty criteria, but also on case law from the late 1940s and 1950s. 37 t In Mills,
relying at least in part on these legal principles, the Court held that jury instructions,
which may have led jurors to believe that they had to unanimously agree on
mitigating evidence before giving it effect, were constitutionally defective.372
Writing for the dissent in Mills, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not characterize the
majority view as unprecedented or novel; rather, he disagreed with the standard for
determining juror confusion and disagreed with373the majority's view that the jury, in
fact, was confused by the judge's instructions.
Sixteen years after Mills, in Beard v. Banks,374 the Court addressed the question
of who should receive the benefit of the principles expressed in Mills and McKoy
and, in particular, whether a habeas petitioner whose conviction and sentence
became final in 1987 was entitled to the holding and principles articulated in Mills
and McKoy 7 5 Banks, like the capital defendants in Mills and McKoy, was
sentenced to death by jurors who may have believed that they had to unanimously
3 76
agree on the mitigating evidence presented in the capital sentencing proceeding.
Needless to say, Banks objected to a sentencing proceeding that was constitutionally
defective in this manner.
A five-member majority of the Court, which included Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, characterized Mills as new.377
Writing for the majority in Banks, Justice Thomas stated that, in determining
367. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192-93.
368. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (footnote omitted). Justice Scalia has strongly criticized the modem death
penalty paradigm and, in particular, has attacked the mitigation component of modem death penalty law as
expressed in Lockett. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), overruled by Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
369. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
370. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), vacated, Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson, 428 U.S. 280; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). See generally COYNE &
ENTZEROTH, supra note 56.
371. Specifically, the Court cited Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949), and Williams v.
Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959), to support its conclusions on the importance of individualized sentencing in
capital sentencing proceedings. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 603.
372. Mills, 486 U.S. at 384.
373. Id. at 390 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
374. 124 S. Ct. 2504 (2004).
375. Id. at2508.
376. Banks v. Hom, 271 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2001), rev'don other grounds, 536 U.S. 266 (2002).
377. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia dissented in Mills. Justice Thomas
was not on the bench at the time of the Mills decision. 486 U.S. 367.
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whether to give a Court decision retroactive effect, the Court engages in a three-step
process... requiring the Court (1) to determine the date on which a conviction and
sentence become final, which, as discussed earlier, is generally when the defendant
has exhausted the state direct appeals process, including the opportunity to seek
certiorari review with the U.S. Supreme Court;37 9 (2) to decide whether the rule or
case law the habeas petitioner wishes to apply to his case is new by looking at the
"legal landscape" at the time the petitioner's conviction became final and deciding
"whether the Constitution, as interpreted by the precedent then existing, compels the
rule"; 380 and (3) if the rule is new, to determine whether either of the Teague
exceptions applies.38 1
Applying this model, the Court decided that Banks' conviction and sentence
became final in 1987382 and then decided that Mills was new because its result was
not dictated by precedent in 1987. It is the determination that Mills constitutes a new
rule that is most remarkable about Banks. As noted above, Mills relied on Lockett
and Eddings for its holding that a unanimity requirement for mitigating evidence
was unconstitutional.38 3 Eddings and Lockett predate 1987.38 Both of these cases,
as well as the 1976 case of Gregg v. Georgiaand its companion cases, were part of
as a
the legal landscape in 1987. The Court, however, characterized Lockett
"generalized" rule that may have supported Mills but did not mandate it. 385
As the Court stated, "Mills' innovation rests with its shift in focus to individual
jurors," and the need to assure that individual jurors may make a determination on
mitigation.386 According to the Court, this "shift in focus" was debatable among
reasonable jurists. 387 As evidence of this debate, the Court pointed out that four
justices dissented in Mills;3 88 coincidentally, these four dissenting justices now
joined Justice Thomas in confining the effect of Mills. Although in a footnote the
Court insisted that "we do not suggest that the mere existence of a dissent suffices
to show that the rule is new, 389 the existence of dissenting justices appeared to
weigh heavily in the Court's conclusion that a rule is new.
The idea that a rule is new because some justices on the Court dissent is quite
removed not only from the Blackstone model of judicial decision making and
traditional concerns of foreseeability in judicial decision making, but also from the

378. 124 S.Ct. at 2510. Justice Scalia offered a different analytical model in Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S.
Ct. 2519 (2004).
379. Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 2510; see supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text. Although this determination
is often straightforward, in Banks' case there was a question of when the conviction became final based on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's consideration of the Mills question in a collateral proceeding. The U.S. Supreme
Court held, however, that Banks' conviction and death sentence became final on October 5, 1987, when the Court
denied certiorari review of his direct appeal. Id. at 2508, 2510-11.
380. Id.at 2510.
381.

382.
383.
384.
Eddings v.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Id.

See supra note 379.
Banks, 124 S.Ct. at2511.
Lockett was decided in 1978, and Eddings was decided in 1982. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978);
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 2512.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2513 n.5.

Winter 2005]

RETROACTIVITY PARADIGM

new rule concerns discussed by Justice Harlan and Professor Mishkin in the context
of habeas proceedings. 39 Mills did not overturn case law; it did not chart out new
legal procedures; it did not add to the responsibilities of states in administering
capital sentencing proceedings. Rather, Mills applied well-recognized principles of
death penalty jurisprudence to a certain sentencing problem in a particular case.
In considering the majority's treatment of Mills as new, it bears noting that Mills,
Lockett, and Eddings stand for a principle of death penalty jurisprudence that some
members of the Court, particularly Justice Scalia, dislike and would prefer to
eliminate. In particular, Justice Scalia stated in Walton v. Arizona 39 1 that he believed
the mitigation prong of modern death penalty jurisprudence was wrong and should
be abolished.392 Notable among Justice Scalia's criticisms of Lockett, Mills, and
McKoy and the line of cases outlining the scope of mitigation evidence in capital
sentencing is his concern that state legislatures' efforts to create capital sentencing
procedures were being undermined when the mitigation line of cases was applied
retroactively.3 93
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented in Banks. In his dissent,
Justice Stevens, who was in the majority in Mills, stated:
When Mills was decided, there was nothing novel about acknowledging that
permitting one death-prone juror to control the entire jury's sentencing decision
would be arbitrary. That acknowledgment was a natural outgrowth of our cases
condemning mandatory imposition of the death penalty, recognizing that
arbitrary imposition of that penalty violates the Eighth Amendment, and
mandating procedures that guarantee full consideration of mitigating evidence.
Indeed, in my judgment, the kind of arbitrariness that would enable 1 vote in
favor of death to outweigh 11 in favor of forbearance would violate the bedrock
fairness principles that have governed our trial proceedings for centuries.
Rejecting such a manifestly unfair procedural innovation does not announce a
"new rule" covered by Teague v. Lane, but simply affirms that our fairness principles do not permit blatant exceptions.3"
According to four members of the Court, not only is Mills not a new rule, but also,
characterizing Mills as new deprives Banks of his expectation that he will receive
the benefit of established principles of capital sentencing law.395 In the dissenters'
view, Banks is not being denied the benefit of a new rule of law; he is being denied
the benefit of the rule of law.396

390. See supranotes 152-202 and accompanying text.
391. 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
392. Walton, 497 U.S. at 656-74 (Scalia, J., concurring).
393. Id. at 668 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("For state lawmakers, the lesson has been that a decision of this Court
is nearly worthless as a guide for the future; though we approve or seemingly even require some sentencing
procedure today, we may well retroactively prohibit it tomorrow.").
394. Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 2516 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted) (citing Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) (per curiam)).
395. Id. at 2516 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
396. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Souterjoined Justice Stevens' dissent but wrote separately, noting that the
reasonable jurist standard used to define a new rule was an objective standard
designed "to distinguish those developments in this Court's jurisprudence that state
judges should have anticipated from those they could not have been expected to
foresee.,397 This distinction harkens back to one of the key reasons for a doctrine
limiting retroactivity: protecting the foreseeable expectations of the parties. Further,
Justice Souter noted that the majority's interpretation of the new rule doctrine "gives
too much importance to the finality of capital sentences and not enough to their
accuracy.,398 Focusing the question of a new rule on foreseeability would bring the
new rule prong of Teague closer in line with the basic purpose of retroactive limits
on changes in the law: protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties-both
the state and the defendant-even in the context of habeas proceedings.
Banks demonstrates the outer reaches of the new rule prong of Teague. If Mills,
which is well grounded in basic death penalty jurisprudence, 399 is a new rule, it is
hard to imagine any capital sentencing decision that is not subject to such
characterization. Not only is this construction of the types of cases subject to
retroactive limitations inconsistent with the writings of Justice Harlan and many
scholars, but also it has the effect of insulating state decisions that are wrong.
Indeed, the purpose of retroactivity, in light of the Teague definition of the new rule
doctrine, is not to protect parties from unforeseen changes in the law; it is not about
reconciling Blackstone's theory of judicial decision making with the realities of
judicial decision making; it is not about how law is made. The new rule component
of Teague, as interpreted by five members of the Court, is a method by which to
limit the scope of constitutional rules of criminal procedure, including capital
sentencing procedures, and to prevent habeas petitioners from obtaining relief and
review in federal court for their federal constitutional claims. Among the recognized
functions of habeas review are protection of wrongfully convicted defendants and
the protection of the rule of law in criminal proceedings; 4W the new rule construct
defeats these purposes.
B. Schriro v. Summerlin: The ExtraordinarilyNarrow Reach of the Teague
Exceptions
The other major retroactivity case that the Supreme Court considered in its
2003-2004 Term was Schriro v. Summerlin.40' At issue in Summerlin was whether
Ring v. Arizona4 02 should be applied retroactively to Summerlin, whose conviction
and sentence were final and whose case was pending in federal habeas review at the
time of the Ring decision. 40 3 Prior to the Court's decision in June of 2004, several

397. Id. at 2517 (Souter, J., dissenting).
398. Id. at 2518 (Souter, J., dissenting).
399. See supra notes 361-364 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 74-114 and accompanying text.
401. 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).

402. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
403. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2521-22.
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law review articles urged that Ring was an appropriate case to apply retroactively.: °
A majority of the Court was not persuaded.
Before discussing the Court's retroactivity analysis in Summerlin, it would be
useful to recount the Court's decision and actions in Ring. In Ring, the Supreme
Court reversed its 1990 decision in Walton v. Arizona.4 5 Under Arizona law, a jury
decided if the defendant was guilty of first-degree murder. 4 After a jury rendered
a guilty verdict, the case was presented to the judge who decided (1) whether the
evidence supported the aggravating factors necessary to render a defendant eligible
for the death penalty' and (2) whether the defendant should be sentenced to life
imprisonment or death.' 8 The Walton Court concluded that the aggravating factors
that made an individual eligible for the death penalty were not elements of the
offense of capital murder, and, therefore, a judge could make those findings. 4°9
Within ten years of Walton, its holding became suspect when the Court decided
Apprendi v. New Jersey,4 10 a non-death-penalty case that dealt with whether a judge
could make certain sentencing determinations. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court
struck down part of a New Jersey hate crime statute that allowed a judge to make
factual determinations, based on a preponderance of the evidence, to increase the
maximum sentence that could be imposed on a defendant.4 ' In Apprendi, the judge,
after accepting a guilty plea from the defendant, determined, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that Apprendi's crime was motivated by racial animus.412 Under New

Jersey's hate crime statute, the judge's finding of that fact allowed the judge to
increase Apprendi's sentence from the maximum twenty years to thirty years.413 The
Supreme Court found this sentencing unconstitutional, holding that, "[o]ther than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
the prescribed statutory
414
a reasonable doubt.

The holding in Apprendi raised significant questions about the viability of
Walton. If it was unconstitutional for a judge to make the factual determination
increasing a sentence from a maximum twenty years to thirty years, how could it be
constitutional for a judge to make the factual determination that increases the

404. Sarah C.S. McLaren, Comment, Was Death Different Then Than It Is Now? The Opportunity Presented
to the Supreme Court by Summerlin v. Stewart, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1731 (2004); Recent Case, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1291 (2004); Ethan Isaac Jacobs, Note, Is Ring Retroactive?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1805 (2003).
405. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
406. Id. at 645 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1105, 13-703 (West Supp. 2004)).
407. See id.at 645 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1105,13-703 (West Supp. 2004)). When the Supreme
Court sanctioned modem death penalty statutes, it required states to provide some rational system for narrowing
the class of individuals who may be subject to the death penalty. See supranotes 364-367 and accompanying text.
Many states, including Arizona, perform this narrowing function by requiring the State to prove certain aggravating
factors about the crime or the defendant that make the defendant subject to the death penalty. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 2004).
408. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-703, 13-1105 (West Supp. 2004).

409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-49.
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Id.
Id. at471.
Id. at 470.
at 490.
Id.
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maximum sentence from life imprisonment to death?" 5 In 2002, in Ring v.
Arizona,4 6 the Court faced the question of how to make peace between Walton and
Apprendi, but found the two cases "irreconcilable., 41 7 The Ring Court4 8 stated that
we overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without
a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death
penalty. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as "the
functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," the Sixth Amendment
requires that they be found by a jury.419
The impact of Ring was significant. Like the classic new rule cases, Ring
overruled previous Supreme Court case law and created a new rule of law. In accord
with Griffith v. Kentucky,420 capital defendants facing trial, or who were on direct
appeal in states like Arizona, were entitled to jury sentencing. Left unanswered by
Ring, however, was the fate of those death row inmates who had been sentenced to
death by a judge and whose conviction and sentences became final prior to June 24,
2002, when the Supreme Court handed down Ring.
The question of the retroactive effect of Ring as well as Apprendi percolated
among various district and circuit courts in the federal court system, and most courts
declined to apply either Ring or Apprendi retroactively. 42 ' However, in Summerlin
v. Stewart,22 the Ninth Circuit directly considered Ring with respect to an Arizona
death row inmate, whose conviction and sentence became final before Ring and who
was sentenced under the Arizona judge-sentencing system.423 The Ninth Circuit
applied Ring retroactively, 4 4 and the Supreme Court accepted certiorari to review
that finding.425
The history of Summerlin's case is interesting, if at times bizarre. In 1981,
Surnmerlin, who the Ninth Circuit described as "extremely troubled,"426 was charged

415. See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, EssentialElements, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1467, 1518-23 (2001).
416. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
417. Id. at 609.
418. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas joined. Id. at 588-609. Justice Scalia issued a concurring opinion in which Justice Thomas joined, id. at
610-13; Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion, id. at 613; and Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment, id. at 613-19. Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 619-21.
419. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000)).
420. 479 U.S. 314 (1987); see supranotes 210-216 and accompanying text.
421. See, e.g., Moore v. Kinney, 320 F.3d 767, 771 n.3 (8th Cit. 2003) (stating it would not apply Ring
retroactively without an express pronouncement by the Supreme Court); Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 398-99 (7th
Cir. 2002) (declining to apply Ring retroactively); Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 992-94 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the Supreme Court did not make Ring retroactive).
422. 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cit. 2003) (en banc), overruled by Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
423. Id. at 1091, 1096-97.
424. Id. at 1121. The Ninth Circuit set forth several reasons for applying Ring retroactively. First, the Court
classified Ring as a new rule of substantive law to which Teague did not apply. Id. at 1108. Second, it stated that
even if Ring was procedural, it fell within the second Teague exception, satisfying the Teague criteria, and should
be applied retroactively. Id. at 1116, 1119, 1121.
425. Schriro v. Summerlin, 540 U.S. 1045 (2003).
426. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d at 1084. The Ninth Circuit also noted that Summerlin has organic brain
dysfunction, has been described as "functionally retarded," has an explosive personality disorder, and has impaired
impulse control. Id. He grew up in an abusive, alcoholic home and dropped out of school in seventh grade. Id. At
one point, he was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and treated with Thorazine, an antipsychotic medication.
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with the murder of Brenna Bailey. 427 He was tried before a jury on first-degree
murder charges.428 The trial lasted four days; after deliberating a little over three
29
hours, the jury convicted Summerlin of first-degree murder and sexual assault.
The only sentence that could be imposed under Arizona law, based on the jury's
first-degree murder charge, was life imprisonment. 4" To impose the death penalty
"
' The case then proceeded to
judge.43
required additional factual findings by the trial
432
Marquardt.
Phillip
Judge
before
sentencing
Judge Marquardt had problems: he was a heavy marijuana user, who used
marijuana during his tenure on the bench and arguably during the time he was
presiding over Summerlin's sentencing hearing.4 33 During his eventual disbarment
proceedings, Judge Marquardt admitted that he was addicted to marijuana and that
he engaged in various illegal schemes to obtain the drug.434 Judge Marquardt at one
point was convicted of misdemeanor marijuana possession in Texas; he was
43 5
suspended from the bench for a year, but nonetheless continued to use marijuana.
43 6
Eventually Judge Marquardt stepped down from the bench and was disbarred. It
is apparently unknown whether the judge, in fact, was using marijuana during
Summerlin's trial, but there is evidence showing Judge Marquardt43 7was having
IOSS.
difficulty concentrating or was experiencing short-term memory
The capital sentencing hearing before Judge Marquardt was brief.438 In its case-inconviction; 439
chief, the State presented certified copies of a prior aggravated assault
in mitigation, defense counsel declined to call witnesses' and relied on a doctor's
report that was attached to the presentence report." The state then called two
rebuttal witnesses. 442 After a weekend recess, the judge announced that he found two
aggravating factors: (1) evidence of a prior felony involving use or threat of force,
manner. *3
and (2) that the murder was committed in a heinous, cruel, or depraved
Based on these findings, Summerlin could now be subject to the death penalty.

Some of the more melodramatic aspects of Summerlin's case are not discussed in the Supreme Court's
decision; however, the Ninth Circuit opinion revealed that Summerlin's initial attorney, a state public defender,
began a romantic relationship with the state prosecutor, who was prosecuting Summerlin, while she was still
representing him. Id. at 1086-88. After the romance began, Summerlin's lawyer decided she had a conflict of
interest, but she did not take any steps to withdraw or to inform her client of this new development. Id. at 1087.
Eventually, new counsel was appointed, although Summerlin still did not know of his original lawyer's conflict of
interest. Id. at 1088.
427. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2521.
428. Id.
429. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d at 1088.
430. Id. at 1085.
431. Id. at 1103.
432. Id. at 1088.
433. Id. at 1089-90, 1089 n.1.
434. Id. at 1089 n.1.
435. Id. at 1090 n.1.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 1090.
438. Id. at 1089.
439. Id.
440. Id. It appears that at one point defense counsel was prepared to call a mitigation witness, but after
consulting with Summerlin, defense counsel advised the court that he would not. Id.

441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 1090.
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Judge Marquardt was not persuaded by Summerlin's mitigating evidence and
sentenced him to die. 4
Summerlin appealed but was denied relief on direct appeal, and it appears that his
conviction and sentence became final in early 1984." Summerlin sought state postconviction relief 4 6 and federal habeas relief,447 but his efforts were repeatedly
unsuccessful until October of 2001, when the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for
an evidentiary hearing on Judge Marquardt's competence. " ' In the meantime, the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ring v. Arizona." 9 At that point, the Ninth
Circuit withdrew its decision in Summerlin's case and deferred submission of his
case until the Supreme Court resolved Ring.45 ° After the Court issued a decision in
Ring, the Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the Summerlin case en banc 45' and
ultimately decided to apply Ring retroactively.452
In accepting certiorari review in Summerlin, the Supreme Court faced a question
it appeared to have dodged in Ring: whether Ring should be applied retroactively to
cases that were final at the time Ring was decided. 45 3 In a five-to-four decision, the
Court decided it should not be applied retroactively.4 54
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion for the Court. In one of the more
interesting aspects of Summerlin, the Court seemed to reframe the Teague analysis
by placing all changes in substantive law outside of Teague altogether and then
recognizing only the second Teague exception.4 55 The Court noted that:
New substantive rules generally apply retroactively. This includes decisions that
narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms, as well as
constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons covered
by the statute beyond the State's power to punish. Such rules apply retroactively
because they "necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands

444. Id. The same day that Judge Marquardt sentenced Summerlin, he also sentenced James Fisher to death.
Fisher was convicted of murdering Marguerite Bailey, who was unrelated to Brenna Bailey, Summerlin's victim.
In Fisher's case, Judge Marquardt also found two aggravating circumstances, including that the murder was
committed in a heinous, cruel, or depraved manner. Id. at 1090-91. Again, Judge Marquardt found no mitigating
factors sufficient to call for leniency, id. at 1091, and he sentenced Fisher to die, id. at 1090. "Fisher eventually
received [state] post-conviction relief on the basis of an unethical plea agreement that Judge Marquardt expressly
entered into as a party and subsequently allowed into evidence at [Fisher's] trial." Id. at 1091; see State v. Fisher,
859 P.2d 179, 184-85 (Ariz. 1993).
445. See State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 676 (Ariz. 1983) (denying reconsideration on Jan. 17, 1984). It does
not appear that Summerlin petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari with respect to his direct appeal.
446. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2521.
447. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
448. Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926, 957 (9th Cir. 2001), withdrawn by 281 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2002),
affd on reh'g, 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
449. 25 P.3d 1139, cert. granted,534 U.S. 1103 (2002).
450. Summerlin v. Stewart, 281 F.3d 836, 836-37 (9th Cir. 2002).
451. Summerlin v. Stewart, 310 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2002).
452. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d at 1121.
453. Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. at 2521.
454. Id. at 2521, 2526.
455. Id. at 2525.
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make criminal"' or faces a punishment
convicted of 'an act that the law does not
4 56
that the law cannot impose upon him.
Distinguishing rules of substantive law from rules of procedural law, the Court
stated:
New rules of procedure... do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct
the law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that someone
convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise. Because of this more speculative connection to innocence, we give retroactive effect to only a small set of "'watershed rules of criminal procedure'
the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceedimplicating
ing. 457
The Court then appeared to eliminate the first Teague exception and recognize
simply that changes in substantive law are not subject to Teague at all.458
It is unclear what if any effect this change will have on the Teague analysis. First,
so few cases fit under the first Teague exception459 that it is unlikely that this
analysis will have a significant impact on Teague jurisprudence. Second, in Banks,
the Court did not endorse this change in analysis, even though Banks and Summerlin
were decided on the same day. Arguably, although it is not completely clear from
the opinion, those cases that previously fell within the first exception-such as those
exempting a group from the death penalty°-fall outside of Teague altogether as
a change in substantive law and for that reason must be applied retroactively.
With respect to whether Ring was a new rule of substantive law, the Ninth Circuit
found that it was because it changed the elements of capital murder."' In support of
this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit cited the language in Ring in which the Court
stated that "enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the functional equivalent of
an element of a greater offense"' of capital murder. 2 The Supreme Court rejected
the idea that Ring represented a change in substantive law and concluded that Ring
was a new rule of procedural law subject to Teague.4 3
Finding Ring procedural, and thus within Teague, the Court then addressed
whether Ring fit into the remaining Teague exception, which has traditionally been
referred to as the second Teague exception.' This exception provides for retroactive application of watershed rules of law that enhance the truth-finding function
of the judicial process. 4 5 As noted earlier, the Court has yet to find a case that fits
within this exception, and it now appears unlikely that it ever will. Consider the

456. Id. at 2522-23 (citations and footnote omitted). The issue of the application of Teague to new rules of
substantive law was at issue, at least in part, because the Ninth Circuit found that Ring was a change in substantive
law that should be applied retroactively. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d at 1121.
457. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2523 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,495 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489
U.S. at 311)).
458. Id.
459. See supra notes 333-336 and accompanying text.
460. See supra notes 335-336 and accompanying text.
461. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d at 1108.
462. Id. at 1105 (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 609).
463. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2526.
464. Id. at 2525.
465. See supra notes 337-338 and accompanying text.
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holding in Ring: the Sixth Amendment requires juries, not judges, to decide the
existence of those factors that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty.4 6 The
five-member majority in Summerlin did not appear to dispute that Ring is a watershed rule of law." 7 In fact, the Court stated that "[tihe right to jury trial is fundamental to our system of criminal procedure." 8 Likewise, in Blakely v. Washington, 469 which also was handed down at the end of the Court's 2003-2004 Term,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that the right to a jury trial "is no mere
procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional
structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the legislative and
executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary." 470
Thus, not surprisingly, the majority's Teague analysis did not focus on whether Ring
is a watershed rule, as that point appears to be conceded; rather, the majority opinion
turned its attention to the truth-finding function of juries in capital sentencing.
The Court acknowledged that having a jury decide factual questions does have
some effect on truth-finding;4 7' however, the majority stated:
The question here is not.. .whether the Framers believed that juries are more
accurate factfinders than judges (perhaps so-they certainly thought juries were
more independent) .... Rather, the question is whether judicial factfinding so
"seriously diminishe[s]" accuracy that there is an "'impermissibly large risk'
of punishing conduct the law does not reach.472
The majority then suggested that the question of whether juries are more accurate
factfinders is a wash because there is evidence suggesting both that juries are more
accurate factfinders and that they are not.4 73 This mixed record, according to the
Court, is insufficient to show that the role of juries in capital sentencing
serves such
474
a truth finding function as to require retroactive application of Ring .
The four dissenting justices7 . disagreed with the majority's assessment of the role
of juries in capital sentencing. Critical to Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion is the

466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
See Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2524-26.
Id. at 2526.
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
Id. at 2538-39.
See Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2524-25.

472. Id. at 2525 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Teague,489 U.S. at 312-13 (quoting Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1968))).
473. See id. at 2525-26. Interestingly, Justice Scalia cites the mixed record on juries from other countries in
this case, id. at 2525, even though the Justice generally rejects reliance on modem day foreign law in constitutional
interpretation. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Equally irrelevant are

the practices of the 'world community,' whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.
'We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are expounding... .[Wlhere
there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the
Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution."')
(quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (alteration in original);
Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC. INT'L L.
PROC. 305,307-08, 310 (2004); see also The Supreme Court, 2003 Term: Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 248,

452 (2003).
474. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2526.
475. See id. at 2526-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting, with Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg, JJ., joining).
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unique role of juries in capital sentencing proceedings.476 Justice Breyer observed
that jury capital sentencing is critical to an accurate assessment of the community's
values and views on the appropriateness of the death penalty in a particular case.477
Juries, not judges, accurately reflect this concern;4 78 moreover, trial judges, who are
often elected to their positions, face potential political pressure that may skew or
distort capital sentencing. 479 As noted earlier, the Supreme Court in Penry applied
480
Teague to capital sentencing without briefing or oral argument on the issue.
Summerlin places in sharp relief the effect of Penry: more than 100 individuals may
be put to death even though their sentences were imposed in violation of the Sixth
Amendment.48'
In contrast to the rigidity of the majority's Teague exception, Justice Breyer
pointed to three factors that he suggested should be considered in deciding retroactivity in capital sentencing proceedings. First, in considering the retroactive
application of a new capital-sentencing rule, the Court should look at the capitalsentencing interest advanced by the new rule.482 The interest advanced by the new
rule in Ring was the role of the jury in making community-based value judgments
on the imposition of the death penalty.483 According to the dissent, the jury is the
decision-making body that is in the best position to make that judgment. 48' The
second consideration in deciding the retroactive scope of a new capital sentencing
rule requires a balancing of the extent to which the new rule advances the values of
the writ of habeas corpus in protecting the innocent and assuring fundamentally fair
procedures with the state's interest in finality by means of an execution. 485 Here,
according to the dissent, the risk that a person may be wrongfully executed outweighs the limited resources needed to apply Ring to the approximately 110
individuals who have been improperly sentenced to death by a judge.486 In particular, Justice Breyer stated, "I believe we should discount ordinary finality
interests in a death case, for those interests are comparative in nature and deathrelated collateral proceedings, in any event, may stretch on for many years regardless., 487 Finally, Justice Breyer distinguished Ring from a non-death penalty case
establishing certain constitutional jury requirements but not requiring retroactive
application.4 88 Specifically, Justice Breyer observed that the effect of applying Ring
retroactively would not be to throw open the courthouse doors; rather, the decision
476. See id. at 2527 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the
Ultimate Punishment:The Requisite Role of the Jury in CapitalSentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1143-45 (2003)

(noting that political pressure on state-elected judges to impose the death penalty distorts the truth-finding function
of judge sentencing).
477. See Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2527 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
478. Id.
479. See Stevenson, supra note 476.
480. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002).
481. 124 U.S. at 2528.
482. See supra notes 212-215 and accompanying text.
483. Ring, 124 S. Ct. at 2528 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
484. Id.
485. Id. at 2528-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
486. See id. at 2530 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
487. Id.
488. See id. (discussing DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968)).
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would affect only a limited number of death row inmates in a limited number of
states whose death sentences had been imposed in an unconstitutional manner.4 89
VII. THE FUTURE OF TEAGUE
As unwise as it often is to make predictions about future Court actions, some
conclusions can be drawn from fifteen years of the Teague doctrine that give insight
into how a majority of the Court may apply the current retroactivity doctrine to
future cases. These observations and predictions also point out the inherent problems
and shortcomings of the doctrine as well as the frustrations that students of Teague
often have in trying to unravel and make sense of the Court's policies, both past and
present, in this area of the law.
As fifteen years of Teague have taught, the new rule doctrine is interpreted in
such an extraordinarily broad manner that it is removed from the traditional
concerns and concepts that gave rise to retroactivity limits in general and in the
context of habeas corpus proceedings in particular. At this point in time, it is not a
stretch to say that a majority of the Court believes that almost all Supreme Court
decisions interpreting or applying a principle of constitutional criminal procedure
may be deemed a new rule.49° It is hard to reconcile this definition of new rule with
some of the fundamental theories of how law is made and who benefits from that
law, even in the context of habeas proceedings. Even Justice Harlan 491 and Professor
Mishkin,492 who crafted a retroactivity model based specifically on the role of the
writ of habeas corpus in the criminal justice system, did not appear to have intended
the retroactivity doctrine to deprive habeas petitioners of established law; indeed,
such a result would undermine the role of the writ in assuring fundamental fairness
and preventing state courts from ignoring federal law. Nonetheless, the current new
rule doctrine arguably classifies new rules as applying to any case in which there
were dissenting justices,493 or where lower courts disagreed or debated an
interpretation of established law, 494 or where the decision did not use the word
"compel" in reaching its holding.495
As to the first Teague exception, Justice Scalia suggests a possible shift in
doctrine in his reformulation of the Teague model of retroactivity analysis in
Summerlin. Justice Scalia appears to advocate elimination of the first Teague exception and seeks to classify cases that prohibit the imposition of criminal punishment
for certain behavior or as to a class of individuals as changes in substantive law not
subject to Teague.4 ' The effect of this change is unclear but may become important
in the 2005-2006 Term. One of the key cases before the Court this term is Roper v.

489. See id. at 2530-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
490. The possible exception to this construction of the new rule doctrine appears to be the Court's
consideration of effective assistance of counsel in capital sentencing proceedings, as indicated in Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362 (2000), and Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).
491. See supra notes 168-202 and accompanying text.
492. See supra notes 152-167 and accompanying text.
493. See supra notes 388-389 and accompanying text.
494. See supra Part V.C.
495. See supra notes 315-326 and accompanying text.
496. See supra notes 456-463 and accompanying text.

Winter 2005]

RETROACTIVITY PARADIGM

Simmons,49 7 in which the Court is to address the constitutionality of executing
individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the time they committed their
crime. If the Court determines that defendants in this category cannot be executed,
the Court will have to decide whether to apply that rule retroactively. Based on
Penry, as it applied and explained the first Teague exception, such a change in the
law would fall within the first exception.498 If Justice Scalia' s formula prevails, the
question will be whether such a rule is substantive and outside the scope of Teague.
While there is language in Summerlin to suggest that it would be substantive and
outside of Teague, at this point in time that question remains open.
As to the second Teague exception, it is hard to imagine any case that will fall
within this exception. If Ring is not a watershed case that substantially increases
accuracy of capital proceedings, what is? Certainly, one could interpret the Court's
refusal to apply Ring retroactively as a signal that Apprendi v. New Jersey4 . and
Blakely v. Washington51 will not be applied retroactively. However, Justice Breyer's
dissent, in which three other justices joined, suggests that in capital sentencing
proceedings a balancing of interests reminiscent of Linkletter, but nonetheless within
the Teague model, is the preferred approach. Such an approach would certainly
reconcile the harshness and utter inflexibility of the Teague exception so that it
actually has meaning as an exception. At present, however, the second exception
remains insurmountable.
Returning to the dilemma of John and Mary: while John receives a new trial,
Mary's case proceeds through habeas review. To receive the benefit of the constitutional protection expressed in Cage v. Louisiana,5 ' Mary faces formidable hurdles.
First, she must persuade the Court that its short per curiam opinion in Cage was not
a new decision. Like Mary and John's cases, the jury instruction in Cage equated
reasonable doubt with "grave uncertainty" and advised the jury that the reasonable
doubt standard did not demand "moral certainty" in the defendant's guilt.50 2 Cage
held that such an instruction violated due process. 50 3 Even if Mary could present a
persuasive argument that Cage was in accord with long-standing doctrine, the Court
in Cage did not use the word "compelled," and the State of Louisiana obviously
thought it constitutional to allow such an instruction. Under Teague, Cage can be
classified as new; it is unlikely to be classified as substantive.
Mary may hope that she nonetheless should receive the benefit of Cage because
it is a fundamental, bedrock rule of law: Cage goes directly to the fact-finding
process because it sets out the burden of proof necessary to sustain a constitutional
guilty verdict.5" In fact, in Cage, the Court stated that the reasonable doubt requirement "is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual
error. ' 50 5 Moreover, Cage is such a fundamental decision and so important to the
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fact-finding process that the Supreme Court has characterized Cage as a structural
error not subject to harmless error review. 5°6 Accordingly, a number of federal
circuit courts of appeal have found that Cage is perhaps that rare case that falls
within the second exception to Teague.5" Such a conclusion makes sense. The
purpose of the reasonable doubt standard is to assure that a criminal trial meets the
constitutional accuracy requirements of due process.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has signaled otherwise. In Tyler v. Cain,55 the
Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, ruled that a petitioner could not raise a Cage
v. Louisiana claim in a second habeas petition because the Supreme Court had not
explicitly made the rule retroactive, as required by section 2244 of the AEDPA. 509
Although the Court declined to state definitively whether Cage is retroactive or not,
the majority certainly hinted that it was not."' ° Accordingly, Mary will likely be
executed without a hearing on her claim that the jury convicted her under a system
that plainly violated the Due Process Clause and that increased the likelihood that
she was wrongly convicted. For Mary, timing is everything.
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Cir. 2004) (forecasting Supreme Court rejection of retroactive application of Cage).
508. 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
509. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2000).
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